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Trialogue

The *Trilateral Commission's* Quarterly
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**... The Great SALT II Debate—America's
Strategy in the Age of Parity—A Changing Balance
in Europe—What Role for Japan?—The Scope
of SALT III ...**

SECURITY in the 1980s

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Editor's Note

As this issue of Trialogue comes out, the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT II), signed in Vienna last June, reaches the floor of the U.S. Senate for what promises to be a historic vote. The debate over SALT is the most prominent focus of a wider and much intensified debate on security which has developed in all three "trilateral" regions in the course of 1979. We have taken this timely opportunity to ask six "authorities" in the politico-military field in North America, Europe and Japan to review the broader security concerns of these regions as our countries enter the new decade. In so doing, Trialogue tries for the first time a "trilateral exercise" on hard security issues. Not surprisingly, the reader will find many differences between the views presented here—though many parallels as well. The articles are, as always, the sole responsibility of their authors. We make them available in the hope that they will contribute to informed discussion of the issues at hand.

This Trialogue is a "first" in at least one other respect: In order to satisfy the growing number of requests we receive for our publications, Trialogue will now be distributed by subscription. It will appear on a quarterly basis—with three issues devoted each year to topical international problems high on our nations' agendas, and a fourth issue covering in detail that year's plenary conference of the Trilateral Commission. In addition, our subscribers will receive the reports of our Trilateral Task Forces—the core of the Commission's work on policy issues.

On this new basis, we will be able to accommodate a larger audience, and to pursue the expansion and improvement of what we hope will become from now on your magazine.

The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Western Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together among these regions.

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SALT II, The Prospects for SALT III, The Security Outlook in Asia

HAROLD BROWN

Answers *Triologue's* Questions



At the end of October 1979, Harold Brown, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, commented at length for Triologue on some key aspects of the security of the trilateral countries. We reproduce here in extenso his answers to the questions of Triologue editor François Sauzey.

SALT II

Q What would you say are the main achievements of the SALT II negotiations and treaty?

A As Secretary of Defense, my primary responsibility is to evaluate SALT II in terms of its impact on the military security of the United States. In that context, the major achievement of SALT is clearly the fact that it limits Soviet strategic forces to numbers far below what Moscow is capable of producing in the absence of a treaty. In every category of restricted weaponry SALT II limits the Soviets to levels significantly less than they could have if they simply continued the pace of their current build-up over the next few years. We get these limits on Soviet forces in return for accepting limits on our own forces which will have virtually no impact on our own strategic plans and programs in the years ahead. These limitations add stability and predictability to our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union, and greatly simplify our own job of defense planning.

To the extent that SALT II stabilizes the strategic balance, it will also permit us to concentrate more attention and resources on other aspects of our overall defense posture which need improvement and modernization. We need to improve our general purpose forces and the ability to move them quickly; we need to work with our NATO allies on

modernizing long-range theater nuclear forces in Europe. SALT II will help us to make available the resources for solving these problems. It will also help our allies to gain the political consensus they need in their own countries to increase their own defense efforts.

Beyond these accomplishments, SALT II serves to continue the process of strategic arms control, which we hope in the next phase of negotiations will lead to substantial reductions in both sides' nuclear arsenals. SALT II will also help us in our efforts to control the growth and spread of nuclear and conventional arms to other nations.

Let me add in conclusion that despite these important achievements, SALT II will not solve all of our strategic problems. That is why we will need to expand our defense efforts even with a treaty. SALT is not a panacea; it cannot substitute for our own vigorous defense programs. But combined with these programs SALT is a valuable means of meeting our nation's strategic needs.

Q Some witnesses before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have pointed out that land-based ICBMs are always likely to be the most accurate, rapidly fireable and powerful strategic weapon. The Soviets have always emphasized such weapons in their strategic nuclear posture—by contrast with the U.S. choice of a "triad." Don't you fear that recent and likely improvements in the very powerful Soviet land-based systems can "reverse the strategic equation on which our security has depended" (Henry Kissinger), and give the Soviet Union a substantial advantage by the early 1980s, particularly since SALT II does not substantially reduce the existing stock of Soviet heavy missiles?

A It is true that by the early 1980s the Soviets will have the combination of guidance accuracy and warhead

numbers that will give their ICBMs the theoretical capability to destroy most of our Minuteman force in a preemptive attack. That is why we are proceeding with the development and deployment of the MX mobile missile.

Fortunately, the future vulnerability of the Minuteman force does not mean the concurrent vulnerability of the United States, precisely because we have maintained a triad of strategic forces—land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and heavy bombers. We can tolerate some temporary degradation in the ICBM force in the years before MX becomes operational because the other legs of the triad will remain strong.

In the longer run it is the United States that will benefit by the decision to maintain a balanced triad of strategic forces, and the Soviet Union that will be penalized for putting the bulk of their strategic firepower in land-based ICBMs. The MX missile will be capable of attacking Soviet missile silos in the late 1980s. In sufficient numbers it could give us effectively the same capability against silos that the Soviets will have in the early 1980s. When we give the Soviets the same problem they gave us, they will have an even greater incentive than we to go to mobile, more survivable ICBMs. These missiles will be less threatening to the United States, and strategic stability will actually be enhanced.

Finally, let me note a common error in the SALT II debate. SALT II does not "give" the Soviet Union a substantial advantage in heavy missiles, at least not in the sense of offering them a gift. The Soviets now have over 300 heavy missiles, and they will keep them in their inventory whether or not there is a SALT II agreement. With SALT II, the Soviets cannot increase the number of heavy missiles, nor can they increase the number of warheads per missile. Without SALT II, of course, they could do both of these things.

Q What is the significance of SALT II for the broader U.S./Soviet relationship? At the time of SALT I, a number of experts pointed out that arms limitation treaties between the two superpowers "necessarily imply a non-written political commitment to moderation" on both sides (Raymond Aron); in the present circumstances, do you feel that such a commitment indeed exists on the part of the Soviet Union—in the light, for example, of its recent actions in Africa?

A I have never believed that the Soviets felt their signature to a SALT agreement committed them to a course of political moderation—or to anything else except the specific provisions of the agreement itself. Soviet behavior under SALT I showed that the

Soviets will comply with the provisions of a strategic arms agreement, but will not feel themselves otherwise obliged to a policy of restraint in non-limited areas of weapons development or other areas of military and foreign policy. We should expect that the Soviets will act the same way under SALT II.

Some observers have argued that we should link SALT II to Soviet good behavior in other areas—to respect for human rights, or more recently, to cessation of destabilizing actions in developing areas of the world. I have never thought that SALT should be used in this manner, or that we were correct to expect that SALT would moderate the adversarial relationship between the United States and Soviet Union. Even with SALT our two nations have fundamental differences of world view that will inevitably lead to clashes of national interests. But SALT is one area where our national interests coincide. Both of us want to diminish the risk of nuclear war. For the United States to frustrate its own interests by insisting on linkage is counterproductive. Linkage suggests that SALT is a favor we are doing for the Soviets. It is nothing of the sort. It is an agreement very much in our own security interests.

Q A number of key testifiers before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee appear to have shifted the debate from SALT II *per se* to the overall strategic posture of the United States—which some witnesses depicted in very pessimistic terms. To what extent would you recommend stepping up the U.S. effort (and budget) in the strategic field in the coming five years, and linking the continuation of the SALT process to global Soviet behavior?

A The first month of SALT hearings quite properly focused on the terms of the agreement and our ability to verify compliance with those terms. Later the debate shifted to a broader context in which the central question was the relationship of the treaty to the overall defense posture of the United States. I think this shift reflected two facts: first, that the Administration did a good job in presenting the treaty and its prospective benefits to the United States; second, that there was a growing realization that SALT II by itself was not enough, that we needed to take a hard look at our defense posture to see where it needed improvements even with SALT II.

I was pleased to see this broadening of the debate and I think it contributed significantly to a growing awareness of defense issues and needs among the American people. I have recommended that we plan to increase the defense budget by no less than a real three percent (that is, after inflation)

every year for the next several years. This level of spending should permit us to make the improvements in our force posture which are necessary in the years ahead. A three percent increase in defense spending is also the goal to which our NATO allies have committed themselves.

Strategic forces account for a relatively small portion of the defense budget, on the order of ten percent. We are planning major improvements in our strategic forces in the years ahead—MX, cruise missiles for our bomber force, a new Trident missile and submarine—which will increase the strategic force budget by far more than three percent per year over the next several years.

In a general way, the continuation of the SALT process cannot help but be linked to global Soviet behavior and the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations. We will be more inclined to negotiate with a nation which commits itself to a stable world order and a peaceful foreign policy. But I think it would be a mistake to set any conditions on the continuation of SALT. I think the process is in our interest despite our continuing differences with the Soviets in many areas of foreign policy.

Looking back on the decade of strategic arms negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union, I think many Americans may have had unrealistically high expectations of what the process would produce. Many thought, or hoped, that SALT would end the arms race and would lead to greater cooperation between the two nuclear superpowers. As we now know—and as we should certainly have expected all along—the superpower competition has continued and the Soviets have undertaken a massive improvement in their military power, quantitatively and qualitatively.

This experience does not invalidate the idea of strategic arms control. SALT is still the only way we can constrain Soviet forces and limit the arms competition between our two nations. But it does mean that we must have a more realistic understanding of what SALT can and cannot do. It can limit Soviet forces, but it cannot change in any fundamental way our relationship with the Soviet Union. Nor can SALT substitute for our own vigorous programs to ensure a survivable and reliable triad of strategic forces. SALT is a complement to our own strategic programs, not an alternative to them.

SALT III—The Regional Balance in Europe and the Gray Area

Q How would you characterize the extent of the Soviet military build-up—both conventional and nuclear—in the European theater and its impact on

the regional balance in Europe? Are you satisfied with present NATO efforts to increase the capability of its forces—through improved weaponry, standardization, etc.? Is the present pace of our efforts sufficient to match the anticipated Soviet military increase?

A

The Soviet Union has improved its conventional and nuclear forces in the European theater both quantitatively and qualitatively. For example, the Soviets produce new tanks, guns and aircraft at two or three times the rate of the United States. In the area of theater nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union is deploying the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bombers, so-called “gray area” systems that have no NATO equivalents. While NATO’s strategy of flexible response and forward defense does not require NATO to match Warsaw Pact deployments man for man or weapon for weapon, the extent of the military build-up represents a serious challenge to which NATO must—and is—responding.

NATO’s adoption of the Long Term Defense Plan (LTDP), with its commitment by member states to average a three percent real growth in defense spending to support modernization of Alliance forces, is aimed at redressing the NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional balance by 1985. NATO is procuring new tanks, attack helicopters, aircraft, anti-tank weapons, artillery pieces, air defense systems and ships. The U.S. has enhanced its early combat reinforcement capability in the European theater. In addition, we have increased our forces deployed in Western Europe by 9,500 since early 1975, bringing our total to about six U.S. division equivalents.

The LTDP was also developed to bring increased efficiency to NATO’s defense effort by improving the levels of coordination and joint planning, and by increasing the standardization of equipment and materiel among NATO forces. To this end, the U.S. has signed agreements with many NATO countries which increase competition for the Alliance-wide defense industry. We have also developed “Dual Production” programs on a number of systems (for example, the COPPERHEAD laser-guided artillery shell and the AIM-9L, a heat-seeking, air-to-air missile). These initiatives should greatly improve the efficiency of Alliance R&D and procurement and provide even greater returns in the future.

Within the area of theater nuclear weapons, the Alliance has already adopted modernization programs for our short- and medium-range systems which feature improved range and accuracy, greater yield flexibility and enhanced safety and security.

At this time, we are also engaged in extensive and close consultations with our NATO allies on the development of six modernization/arms control programs for long-range theater nuclear systems and we expect an Alliance decision by year's end. Principal candidate systems for modernization include cruise and ballistic missiles which are highly survivable, accurate weapons capable of penetrating Warsaw Pact defenses.

In summary, NATO is responding forcefully to the challenge posed by the Soviet conventional and nuclear buildup. The Alliance adoption of the Long-Term Defense Plan and their deliberations in the area of theater nuclear weapons promise to enhance NATO's deterrence and ensure the viability of its strategy of deterrence and defense. The job is not yet done, however, and we must continue our efforts, particularly with respect to our commitment to the goal of three percent real growth in defense spending to support our modernization program. We remain confident that the U.S. and our NATO allies will carry forward and fulfill the objectives we have set forth for ourselves, thus demonstrating once again the resolve and cohesion of NATO.

Q SALT III appears to be potentially a very divisive issue between the United States and its European allies. In this respect, doesn't the SALT II protocol create a dangerous precedent; I am thinking of the views expressed by some Europeans that this protocol constitutes an unprecedented commitment on the part of the U.S. with respect to theater weapons—deployment of cruise missiles—without any parallel restraint on the part of the Soviet Union.

A The SALT II protocol does not create any dangerous precedents—either for strategic weapons or theater weapons. The protocol limits on ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) prohibit deployment of such systems during the period of the protocol. Those limits do not apply to the development of GLCMs and SLCMs after expiration of the protocol at the end of 1981. We will not be ready to deploy either a GLCM or SLCM until after 1981. Thus, our GLCM and SLCM programs are not in practical terms limited in any way by the protocol.

The protocol does not represent unilateral restraint on the part of the United States. The four articles of the protocol apply equally to the U.S. and the USSR.

Q Precisely on what condition(s) would you envisage including theater nuclear weapons in the SALT III discussions?

A We are in the process of examining possible approaches to SALT III. Theater nuclear systems, especially long-range theater systems, are of course possible candidates for discussion in SALT III, and we are engaged in detailed consultations with our NATO allies on issues related to such limitations. More generally, as Secretary Vance stated during testimony on the SALT II treaty in July, it is the U.S. position that any future limitations on U.S. systems designed principally for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

Q Such weapons are of particularly vital concern to Western European countries. If they are indeed included in SALT III, how do you picture concretely the role of the NATO allies in the negotiations?

A It is the intention of the United States and our NATO allies to hold close and continuing consultations in connection with further U.S.-USSR negotiations in SALT III, and especially on limitations of nuclear systems directly related to the security of the Alliance. As you probably know, this spring NATO established a Special Group (chaired by the United States) to examine arms control approaches for long-range theater systems which could complement the long-range theater modernization program which is currently under review in NATO. The Special Group is indicative of the firm partnership the United States will maintain with its NATO allies on these vital issues for the Alliance. This kind of close consultation will continue when we move into negotiations in SALT III.

ASIA

Q You recently had discussions with Ganri Yamashita, the Director General of Japan's Defense Agency. Do you feel that there exists a new—and, if so, justified—concern for security in Japan?

A Yes. There is an increasingly public debate in Japan concerning security. The causes of this growing Japanese concern include:

- The Soviet military buildup in Asia;
- doubts—unjustified I believe—about U.S. staying power in Asia—sparked primarily by our realignment of forces following termination of our involvement in Vietnam; and

- an awareness that while Japan is the world's second largest economic power, its ability to achieve real security by military means is dis-

proportionately small—about seventh—and that without such capability, Japan's vital political and economic interests cannot be guaranteed.

These factors and other world conditions such as uncertainties concerning access to oil and other raw materials which come mainly from areas which are experiencing serious political crises or other instabilities, all have contributed to Japan's concerns—and these are justifiable concerns.

Q How do you see the prospects for improved cooperation in the military field between Japan and the U.S.?

A To meet the challenge to its security presented by the above conditions, Japan has now chosen to increase its defensive military cooperation with the United States. We now are conducting direct military to military planning talks and combined exercises, and Japan is procuring modern U.S. weapons such as the P-3C ASW aircraft, the F-15 fighter, and the E-2C Early Warning and Airborne Control Aircraft. These developments will permit our respective forces to complement each other more effectively.

Other examples of increasing U.S.-Japan cooperation include the training of Japan Self-Defense Force personnel at U.S. military schools and Japanese initiatives to assume an increasing portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan.

I see these and other forms of cooperation increasing throughout the 1980s.

Q To what extent has the Administration's policy of phased withdrawal of ground troops from South Korea been reversed in recent weeks?

A The phased withdrawal of ground combat troops from South Korea will remain in abeyance, as announced by the Presidential statement of July 20, 1979. Some reductions of personnel in U.S. support units, however, will continue. This will include one I-Hawk air defense battalion. The timing and pace of further withdrawals will be reexamined in 1981. That review will pay special attention to a restoration of a satisfactory North-South balance and evidence of tangible progress toward a reduction of tensions on the peninsula.

Q To what extent does the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship alter the balance of power in Southeast Asia?

A The new close relationship between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is essentially the product of Soviet opportunism in seeking to fill a political-military vacuum in Indochina. It is made possible by Vietnamese dependence on the USSR, for food, other essential commodities, and military

hardware. This new relationship has the potential for altering the balance of power in the Pacific basin, but this has not yet happened.

The present relationship probably is neither as close as it appears to be, nor as durable. But it will continue, at the least, until Vietnam is able to feed itself and until the threat from China subsides.


The SRV-USSR link-up is less of a threat to the region than might otherwise be the case because of the resurgence experienced by the ASEAN nations in the last five years. There has been improvement in economic, socio-political, and psychological terms. This is in marked contrast to communist Indochina which since victory in 1975 has been the scene of extraordinary disarray.

The USSR also has suffered loss of influence and status in the region because of its endorsement of SRV policies, such as the refugee policy, which ASEAN nations find an anathema.

Q Would the U.S. envisage anything to promote military cooperation with the ASEAN countries in the new situation?

A All of the members of ASEAN have expressed concern over the presence of large Vietnamese military forces in Kampuchea* and the threat they present to Thailand and the region. Each of these countries, in greater or lesser degree, has reacted by budgeting increasing amounts for strengthening its military capabilities. Much of the new military equipment being procured is sought from the United States. The U.S. has responded by selling appropriate military equipment and financing a portion of its purchase price, providing significant military training, and conducting periodic exercises with one or more of the ASEAN countries.

Additionally, a long-term basing agreement was recently concluded with the Philippines which enables strong U.S. air and naval forces to remain in the Southeast Asian area.

The aggregate of these responses is contributing to a significant increase in commonality of equipment and operational military doctrine which in turn provides the basis for desired levels of military cooperation among the ASEAN countries. This notwithstanding, the U.S. recognizes that military cooperation is not one of the purposes of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and while strengthening cooperation with individual members of ASEAN, does not seek to increase military cooperation with ASEAN *per se*. Our purpose is to help maintain peace and stability and to respond to the requests of friendly countries which discern a threat to their national security. 

*Kampuchea, i.e., Cambodia.

Gen. Alexander Haig

—AN INTERVIEW



Since his return to the United States last June after four and a half years as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., has repeatedly warned in speeches across the country of the mounting perils he sees threatening the security of the U.S. and its allies. Testifying in July before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Haig recommended that a

vote on the SALT II treaty be delayed until its "flaws have been resolved" and the Administration's defense policy thoroughly reviewed.

In a wide-ranging conversation with *Dialogue* editor François Sauzey, at the end of September, the General discussed his firsthand experience in the European theater and the possibility of his entering the 1980 U.S. Presidential race. Reflecting on Henry Kissinger's much-publicized remarks in Brussels last September on the credibility of America's nuclear umbrella in Europe, he outlined the main challenges facing the NATO forces. We also asked General Haig whether he thought the outcome of the SALT II debate should be linked to the withdrawal of the Soviet "brigade" in Cuba; and if he was satisfied with Washington's assurances with respect to the protocol of the SALT II treaty—the provisions of which are viewed by some Europeans as an unprecedented U.S. commitment on theater nuclear weapons vital to European security without corresponding Soviet restraint.

Following are excerpts from General Haig's remarks:

The Bottom Line of a Firsthand Experience in Europe; We Are All in the Same Boat

One of the really great lessons I have drawn from my experience in Europe is the perception of the commonality of the problems facing all Western industrialized states, regardless of the political systems under which they may operate. This is particularly obvious if you look at it in the context of the current socio-economic crisis, which has a unique character and many common seeds in the market economy systems of our industrialized societies. It is clear to me that the problems America and its executive leadership are facing are not too distinct in character.

These problems can conveniently be broken into several categories: There is the *fiscal* dimension—the need for us to achieve greater budgetary restraint, and to insure that the increasing trend towards deficit financing is brought under control in an evolutionary way, not a revolutionary one. There is the need for *monetary* reform in a number of areas where tax bases sometimes stifle growth and inhibit by and large our citizens' savings and investments. Closer to us in the United States, there is also the need to lift the countless inhibitions on further developments of modern technology in our industrial sector and of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. There is the new and increasingly worsening impact of the limitations and price increases of *raw materials*, especially energy, for which no country can find separate, single-course solutions. And there is the impact of *modern communications* on executive leadership in all our Western so-

cieties—television, the tendency it has to drive political leadership into a populist mode, and the dangers of such a mode. (In this respect, I am a great believer in the need to go back to some of the values propounded by Edmund Burke, namely that a political leader must be dictated to by his own conscience as well as his perception of a popular mood.)

There is a set of broad lessons, but truly, the bottom line in all these lessons is the commonality of problems facing us all and the necessity for us to recognize that, since we have become increasingly interdependent, we no longer have the luxury to escape the requirements of cooperation. I do believe that, as is amply demonstrated by recent history, dealing with the problems of energy, the Third World and the North-South dialogue, and *certainly* our security, is going to require a much greater degree of international cooperation, coordination, and partnership. This does not mean that we should shun natural competitive forces—these forces are both healthy and essential to our societies. All I am saying is that the Western industrialized nations, including Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, are in the same boat and must work together. As a military man, when I see worsening trends in Western military capabilities in the face of the current Soviet build-up, my greatest concern is that these trends—coupled with a number of insanities in post-Vietnam, post-Watergate America—tend increasingly to create doubts and uncertainties which inevitably affect our ability to deal with the wider, socio-economic problems I have mentioned: energy, monetary affairs, trade, etc.

The current mood in Europe is a good illustration of this. Most Americans, I think, have long since concluded that we should support a greater European unity. This is not a trend which would run counter to the broader, trilateral cooperation which is also required. Yet, in recent months, as problems have developed in the American leadership, Europe's sense of insecurity and lack of confidence has begun to generate initiatives which have exclusive and protectionist overtones. I am very, very worried about this. I do not want it to be interpreted as a criticism of European economic unity, which, if its motivations were more in line with the broader need for cooperation, I would be a *zealot* of. But when European initiatives towards unity arise *as a consequence of* frustration with America's inability to lead and orchestrate a wider cooperative effort, then I see great trouble in the offing.

The Credibility of America's Nuclear Umbrella: New Challenges to NATO's Planning

One should be very careful about drawing sharp interpretations of what Dr. Kissinger did actually say in Brussels* I sat there and listened to his speech, I discussed it with him after

the fact, I have reread it at least three times, and I think there has been some predictable mischief-making by those who do not share Dr. Kissinger's philosophic attitude. I have *no question* about the American nuclear guarantee. When you indulge in a theological discussion, in a theological test tube, as Henry had to do in such a speech, in trying to highlight the dangers of *future* trends you may appear to suggest *contemporary* conditions; but I do not think it was Henry's intent at all. Rather, he wanted to raise a red flag of danger, one which must be visible on both sides of the Atlantic during the decade of the 1980s. Incidentally, America's current nuclear inventory is substantial, it is diverse, it is technically capable, and it meets the current needs for deterrence; the guarantees it offers remain, I think, active and healthy. But it is unfortunate for the SALT II accords themselves that they have come at a time in history when 15, if not 19, years of American defense policies have culminated in a situation where some of the premises of these policies now appear to be increasingly specious—one being the flirtation with Mutual Assured Destruction that Henry has done a "mea culpa" on. In this respect, I can't say I'm a Johnny-come-lately, because I used to argue vigorously with Henry on this subject. In short, I think Henry's desire was to stress before a primarily European audience that the challenge they are now facing with regard to the modernization of their nuclear capabilities was a matter of *vital* and increasing importance, one on which they couldn't afford to indulge in self-delusion.

I think he also correctly pointed out that there was confusion with respect to the rôle of regional nuclear forces. The point is that we have toyed frequently with the conception that you can conduct nuclear warfare at various levels with reasonable assurances that it will remain at these levels; versus the other school of thought according to which anything nuclear will lead to extensive exchange. Now, the planning we do within the Alliance tends to be based on the perception of the strategic balances. In the sixties we introduced the concept of flexible response—and we failed as an alliance to proceed with the necessary theater modernization; we diverted our attention from the real requirement: intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missiles on the European continent; then we flirted with the so-called NATO multinational, submarine-launched nuclear force—which fell of its own weight because of the inherent contradictions in the concept. We are faced today with the consequences of those failures, and unfortunately we did not recognize this as we were planning for more flexible, so-called selective use of force. The fact is that all these choices make sense *only* if the West has a superior theater nuclear capability: In these matters, the message or signal you send is crucial, and I ask you, what kind of a message are you sending if you selectively introduce the use of nuclear weapons when the response can be an overwhelming one? That kind of planning is therefore out of phase with the balances which have developed.

*See Dr. Kissinger's widely echoed remarks, in Brussels, in September 1979, on the credibility of America's nuclear umbrella.

Europe's Fears About the SALT II Protocol

I was very disturbed by the protocol attached to the SALT treaty, and I was even more disturbed when I found out that it had been put there at the initiative of the American negotiators, not the Soviets. Clearly, it was motivated in part by the desire to get some other concessions from the Soviet side. Yet, in hindsight, this is an aspect of SALT II which is very hard to explain: If, as indeed we must insist, this protocol has no meaning, then why is it there in the first place? Here, a European analyst finds himself somewhat at odds with the kinds of assurances given by the Administration. As I testified in the Senate, this is *not* a legal question, but a *political* one; and since it is political, the assurances which are being proffered now will ultimately hinge on political realities: What leverage will be available to the West to *terminate* this protocol under conditions that are not politically less palatable?—that is the essence of the problem. And this is why I have been among those who expressed great concern about it. I might add that my concern had to do not only with the substance of this issue, but also with the procedure: I sat in Brussels the day our allies heard about the protocol, and I happened to hear about it myself on that same day—that tells you something about the glorious kind of consultation that prevailed. It came as a complete shock.

Linking SALT II to the Soviet "Brigade" in Cuba?

To wonder whether there is such a thing as linkage or not is a sterile argument: Linkage is a fact of life. Nations have never dealt with one another without a full assessment of the functional areas in which their business is conducted, and they *must* keep in tandem the comprehensive, integrated whole if their policies are to have any coherence at all. This is my definition of linkage, as distinct from the kind of mechanistic, rigid applications of this concept coming in some instances from people who have been the greatest opponents of linkage. The very first point I made in my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was that, as we apply the various elements of détente in functional areas—trade, credit and technology transfers, agricultural support, arms control—we must measure them against corresponding Soviet conduct abroad. It is therefore imperative that we sort out our thinking on this. Before you can even assess the flaws in the SALT treaty, the American President has an obligation to spell out to the American people his concept of what East-West relations in general are to be. It is rather paradoxical that some of the legislators who vehemently attacked the concept of linkage have now become, just six weeks later, the proponents of a rigid, mechanistic linkage with respect to the Soviet presence in Cuba. I would not be a proponent of this kind of stance. The Soviet presence in Cuba has been modified over time in a broader sense—

with the introduction of MIG-23s, additional naval base construction, and only now the reported change in the nature of the Soviet troops. Clearly, the problem here is not one of mechanistic linkage to SALT II. We are faced, rather, with a *long-standing process of political change* which is highly dangerous to the United States—especially when you consider the forty to fifty thousand Cubans who are operating abroad and do the work of the Soviet Union in establishing client-state relationships in a number of non-aligned nations whose relationship with the West is of vital importance to us.

Extending NATO's Watch to the Middle East and the Persian Gulf?

What I really said in Brussels in September is that, whether the Alliance likes it or not, it is going to be increasingly affected by events outside its geographic confines. But I also emphasized that ours is a collective endeavor of *sovereign* nations. In a practical sense, I do not foresee in the near term the necessary consensus to broaden the geographic areas of responsibility of the Alliance. Nor do I necessarily believe that it is in the Alliance's best interest to be engaged in a broadening process and involved in these other areas. On the other hand, because the Alliance is a collective of sovereign nations, maintaining watching briefs on areas outside the Alliance, and having intense discussions and studies to assess the impact of outside developments on the health and vitality of the Alliance itself, will contribute to a consensus in each of the national capitals—a consensus with respect to what the facts are, to begin with. And such a consensus on the facts in turn facilitates coordinated action by those nations who have a direct stake in these developments. This, I think, is a pragmatic approach to the challenges of the future for NATO. It is my view that NATO simply *must* broaden its discussion and study, but not its planning for coordinated action—that must be done in the capitals of the nations most concerned.

A Bid for the Presidency?

I left Europe deeply concerned by the *sense of a drift* in the United States—by the perceived inability of the U.S. to deal with its run-away double-digit inflation and declining economic growth rates, its inability to come up with a coherent energy program, and the profound impact this was having on our relationships in Europe. Historically speaking, it is understandable that after the debacle in Vietnam, and after Watergate, the U.S. would face some trouble in its relationships with our long-standing partners in Europe and Asia. I would have advocated, and I *have* advocated, that the priority of American foreign policy in such a period be to restore confidence in America's reliability as a partner and in the consistency of its policy. Instead, we have been whipsawed by a series of contradictory, sometimes theologically-pro-

pelled initiatives in a host of areas—e.g., pressures on Bonn to prime the pump and go into deficit spending; ideologically-dominated pressures on our partners in the area of peaceful nuclear energy and technology transfer, with even some blackmail threats related at least initially to the provision of enriched uranium; and contradictory signals in the implementation of the human rights concept—a concept which, incidentally, no one can challenge; if the Nixon/Kissinger and Ford/Kissinger era seemed to have an amoral flavor of *Realpolitik*, I suggest it was more a question of nuance than of fact.

All this could have been dealt with far more effectively. Instead, in many cases, we have alarmed and alienated our friends: To the more progressive left-wing governments, we were uselessly irritating the Soviets and putting détente in jeopardy; and to the more conservative governments, we were selectively bludgeoning our friends and leaving the totalitarian regimes of the East basically untended. And thus two conflicting forces were merged against the United States. I don't have to spell out the consequences of the neutron bomb fiasco—it had a devastating impact. In the end I believe many Europeans would prefer an America they could stand back from and criticize sometimes for its aggressiveness and boldness, while secretly applauding it. But when they find America immobilized in situation after situation where blatant illegal Soviet-intervention is involved, the consequences are very worrisome. Admittedly, the Euro-

peans are not eager to pick up the cudgel—with the single exception of France, which has carried out a very courageous work in Africa. On the other hand, it must be realized that our policies have been very unsettling to Europe, at a time when the main objective of American policy should have been precisely the opposite.

All of this left me increasingly concerned. I had an obligation to serve the Alliance, the North Atlantic Council—one fifteenth of me has worked for Washington in the last four and a half years Yet, if American policies are counterproductive over a period of time, someone who had my responsibilities is bound to be asked: "What have you done?" I felt therefore that the time had come for me to return home and address these issues. That is the main motivation of my current activities—not an aspiration for political office. I have found my audiences here to be increasingly responsive, and I have been advised repeatedly to enter the political scene. I do not preclude doing so, if I feel it would be *constructive*—not if I feel I would win, but rather if I feel it can further the concerns which I have returned home to emphasize, and shape the debate on the issues for 1980. I have not decided yet if it can be constructive for me to run. I am now in the process of assessing how much I have progressed. Time is running out; if I were to go the political way, I would certainly have to make a decision well before the first of December—and I intend to do so.



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Atlantic Solidarity and the Defense of the West: A New Strategic Equation by François de Rose



François de Rose served as France's Ambassador to NATO from 1970 to 1975. He is the author of La France et la Défense de l'Europe. Ambassador de Rose is now Président-Directeur-Général of the Société Nouvelle Pathé Cinéma in Paris.

Whatever one thinks of the substance of the agreements signed in Vienna on June 18th, 1979, by President Carter and Chairman Brezhnev on the limitation of strategic weapons, one thing is sure: The passionate debate prompted in the United States over the merits or lack thereof of these agreements has elicited some echo in Europe—and that in itself is a new thing when compared to the “Uncle Sam knows best” attitude which characterized the previous steps in that negotiation—namely, SALT I in 1972 and Vladivostok in 1974.

As far as the perception by the Europeans of the basic link of their security with the balance of intercontinental forces between the two superpowers is concerned, the discussions which are now taking place in Washington have unquestionably had an educational value. To be sure, the comments made in Europe do not have the degree of sophistication which characterizes the passionate arguments made in the United States by those who oppose and those who back the SALT II agreement, arguing on the number of launchers, re-entry vehicles, throw-weight, accuracy, hardening of silos and so on. But a perception that the outcome of the debate is a matter of interest to the Europeans begins of late to appear, at least in public opinion as expressed by the press. The turmoil unleashed by Henry Kissinger's statement in Brussels on September 7th when he asked whether it was realistic to base a strategy on the threat of mutual suicide bears witness to that perception.

As for governments, they prefer to appear concerned

mostly by the political aspects of the treaty and largely by its impact on the future of détente. Hence, probably, the expression of satisfaction, which some of them made public, at the parity which SALT II is supposed to establish between the American and Russian strategic forces. A rather surprising assessment for, if parity has any meaning by itself (a view that could certainly be challenged), why should it be considered as a good thing for the West when it replaces a situation where the United States, for three decades, enjoyed clear superiority over the Soviet Union?

However, any judgment on the SALT agreement does not bear on the real substance of the matter. As they stand, the texts now under consideration by the U.S. Senate reflect a certain situation, a certain relation of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. They do not create it. They are more in the nature of the photography of a landscape than of the landscape itself. The picture may be pleasant or unpleasant. But the reality does not rest with the picture. Nor is it limited by the panorama thus represented. The whole surroundings must be taken into account and, for what we are concerned with here, we must also bear in mind that the balance in strategic weapons has to be seen in a vast context which includes other forces and is characterized in particular by the promotion of the Soviet Union to the status of a world military power that can either directly or, preferably, by proxy, intervene in almost any corner of the planet, has become a naval power of the first magnitude, and an Empire whose leaders seem to understand and apply in the most efficient manner the rules of geostrategy and the technique of indirect strategy.

In this perspective it is commonplace to say that all nations are concerned by the changes taking place in the respective positions of power and influence of Washington and Moscow in the world. Yet those who find the expression of their common interests in their participation in the Tri-lateral Commission are certainly more involved than any other. And since the situation in Europe is, at the same time,

the most stable in the world and the one whose destabilization would have the most far-reaching consequences, it is perhaps useful to examine the developments now underway in the military field as seen with European eyes.

Many studies have been devoted to this question, and this is not the place to go into details. Accepting the inevitability of being incomplete, one can say that the most important features of the situation appear to be:

a) The vulnerability of U.S. land-based intercontinental missiles and the adverse relation of the number of re-entry charges to the number of targets in that category of weapons. As a result, with the improvement of accuracy that Soviet missiles are credited with, the USSR will, in the coming years, enjoy a first strike anti-force capacity which it did not have in the past, and which creates the situation Henry Kissinger had in mind in the statement mentioned above. This does not mean that such an attack is likely. But it does mean that in a crisis, this reversal of the situation of superiority which America enjoyed for a long time will weigh on the minds of the chief protagonists ... and also of others.

b) The alternatives in Europe are not without resemblance to what happens at the strategic level. With their new medium-range missiles (SS-20s) and bombers (Backfires), the Soviet forces will, in the near future, acquire a first strike anti-force capacity that will probably threaten most of the NATO military targets they might want to eliminate in a war and whose vulnerability would, again in time of crisis, put the Western allies in a situation of clear inferiority. This means that, whereas the superiority of Russian conventional forces was balanced so far by the superiority of American theater nuclear forces, this "balance of imbalances" will disappear more or less at the same time as at the strategic level. The change we have just noted is taking place. This may raise the question of the future validity of the defense doctrine of the Alliance known as "flexible response," in which the Western powers would use the weapons necessary to contain any aggression short of resorting to massive attack against non-military targets, unless in retaliation. This doctrine is based on superiority in numbers, accuracy, and mobility of arms systems, all of which confer the capacity to control escalation, hopefully to the level necessary to maintain the political objectives of defense. Such control can only be achieved by the strong against the less strong. The heavyweight fighter can control his punches against a weaker opponent and adapt and limit the use of his superiority to the desired result. The opposite is not true. With the changes now introduced in their weaponry, the Soviet leaders will be in a position to share the capacity to control

escalation, thereby putting the West in a more difficult position for keeping a credible and efficient defense posture.

c) Deterrence, as was just said, is based on the risk of escalation which results from the link between conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic forces. This coupling of United States central strategic forces with theater weapons is the translation in the military field of the political ties which make the security of the nations on both sides of the Atlantic of vital interest to each other.

Does that coupling remain as strong in a situation where the Soviet Union could, as a result of the greatly improved accuracy of her new intercontinental weapons, attack the land-based American missiles with considerably reduced danger of collateral damage? In the context of the defense of Europe, would the use of arms belonging to the U.S. strategic systems, even if they are launched from submarines, retain its credibility to friend and foe alike if the latter can retaliate by an attack on weapons based on American territory with enough accuracy not to render likely anti-city retaliation?

This is not a criticism of the policy of the United States, let alone a questioning of its motives. The "weakening of the U.S. guarantee," which is sometimes referred to as a summary of the situation just described, is a rather unhappy wording. For there never was a guarantee in the form of a commitment of the United States to bring about a world holocaust in case its allies were attacked. What there was, and what remains, is a declared policy that the integrity of Western Europe is of vital interest to the American nation. The question now raised is therefore not of a political nature but one of implementation. And the fact that it is raised was probably inevitable, even if the pace has come as something of a surprise, for it proceeds from technological developments in Soviet weaponry that had to be expected from a nation endowed with all the resources of power.

Thus there would be no point in putting the blame on anyone in particular. We must take stock of the situation now taking shape and see what there is to be done to restore, as best we can, effective deterrence across the board. The first thing we need to achieve is a good understanding of the situation and as much agreement as possible on the line of conduct to follow. So we had better be candid about it and recognize that some pitfalls will have to be avoided in the years to come.

One such pitfall concerns the future of SALT. Important as are the attempts at limiting qualitative and quantitative developments of strategic weapons, there is a danger that the talks become the very symbol of détente rather than its substance, whereby they would be pursued for their own sake rather than for the results achieved. We already have a taste of this when SALT II, with a substantial increase over the numerical limits of launchers set by SALT I, is nonetheless considered an improvement!

The next danger is the inclusion in the future talks of "gray area" weapons (as medium-range weapons deployed on European soil are often called) in order to bring new fuel to the negotiations and because the Russians have long insisted upon discussion of American arms stationed in Europe capable of reaching their territory (the so-called Forward Based Systems) as well as of French and British strategic forces. Such a demand was resisted by Americans and Europeans alike in the SALT I and II negotiations, but Washington seems ready to agree to it in the next phase.

This may need a little explanation. For if Soviet medium-range missiles create for Western Europe the dangers mentioned above, one could well think that it would be to our advantage to reach an agreement that would put a ceiling to their development. Yet this is not so. For, even if the Soviets were to reduce by 10 percent or 20 percent the numbers of SS-20s and Backfires they plan to produce, it would not make the slightest difference in the resulting threat as long as they number in the hundreds. Paying a price for such an outcome would not make sense. Therefore, even before the negotiation starts, it is plain that it can have only one of two results. Either it leads to parity in medium-range missiles deployed in Western Europe and the western part of the Soviet Union, or it recognizes the disparity in favor of the Soviet Union.

Parity, at first glance, would appear worth trying to reach. Yet the Soviet medium-range force is already of such size that it is most likely out of the question for financial, political and geographical reasons, that it could be matched on our side of the old continent. But even if we could do it, there is the danger that it would create the feeling that the security of Europe is no longer a common responsibility of all the members of the Atlantic Alliance, and that the U.S. strategic forces no longer play a part in deterrence as far as Europe is concerned.

If parity is therefore neither attainable nor desirable, the only result from a negotiation over the gray area is bound to be the political and juridical ratification of the Western Alliance's inferiority in that range of armaments, which is the most important for the balance of forces on the European theater. And it would mortgage the future when we don't know the problems that political and technological challenges in the coming decades might present.

Another problem is that of the measures needed to cope with the situation created by the new form of the Soviet threat, both at the strategic and theater levels. There are two aspects to that problem. One concerns the substance: namely, the programs of production and deployment of new weapons. The second concerns the procedure: How are the decisions to be made. Clearly, at the strategic level, the responsibility lies with the United States—and the decisions concerning a mobile intercontinental missile (MX) have now been made.

The same cannot be said of a mobile medium-range missile for Europe. This is not the place to argue in detail the reasons that make the deployment of such a weapon advis-

able. Suffice it to say that, by its mobility, it would have a high degree of survivability to an attack and that those remaining would present the enemy with the danger of a very powerful retaliation in second strike missions. In other words, it would deprive the Red Army of the advantage it seeks to obtain with a stunning first strike capacity.

The decision on this new type of theater weapon has still to be made. But, assuming that the reasons appear compelling enough, the way it is reached is no less important. The thing to avoid is repeating the muddle that took place about the neutron bomb when it was first proposed to the Europeans, who were so embarrassed that they failed for a long time to express an opinion. And when, eventually, two governments gave a positive answer, action was postponed in Washington.

What is needed at this juncture is a clear decision to implement a program of production and deployment of mobile missiles with a range sufficient to reach the territory of the Soviet Union, and with re-entry vehicles accurate enough to threaten military targets with minimum possible collateral damage. Such a decision should be made by as many governments as possible, not only by those who will produce these missiles or on whose territory they would be deployed. For there is no doubt that if it were only to be decided by those thus immediately involved, they would be branded as saboteurs of détente and enemies of the development of peaceful relations between East and West. International as well as internal reasons make it necessary that a decision taken in the interest of all Western nations (for it concerns the security of all of them in Europe just as much as the decision over the MX in the United States concerns the Europeans) be backed by as many of them as will care to understand the nature of the problems on which the future of their peoples depend.

This will not be an easy stand to take since many governments will be under pressure not to assume responsibility in that matter. For our negotiation position has deteriorated to such a point that trying to have in Europe a weapon of the same category as those which threaten us is to be represented as outright provocation.

Finally, there will certainly be voices advocating that the adoption of such a program be kept as a possibility by the West or, better, as a bargaining card in various deals with the Soviet Union. The only result of such an attitude would be to give the successors of Mr. Brezhnev the possibility of preventing a decision of vital importance for the security of Western nations while their own program would be fully implemented.

Let us hope therefore that we may be capable of recognizing squarely the problems we are confronted with and that we can at least agree on the proposition that, dangerous as would be the decoupling of the military forces that ensure our common security, a "decoupling of minds" would be the greatest danger that could threaten the nations that share a common destiny.



Security: A European Perspective

by Karl Kaiser



Dr. Kaiser is Director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn. Among his books are German Foreign Policy in Transition (1969) and Europe and the United States (1973).

The thirtieth anniversary of the NATO Alliance should, in theory, be the occasion for a positive review of its achievements. NATO has been the essential prerequisite for the longest period of peace in Europe in this century and, as the first alliance in modern history, it has enlarged its purpose in order to secure peace by non-military means, namely by arms control and détente policy with the adversary, and has acted accordingly. But the celebrations are overshadowed by numerous concerns, for a debate on the credibility of deterrence has begun, the arms race continues, the ratification of the SALT II agreement between the two superpowers remains uncertain, the Vienna negotiations for troop reduction are stalled, and on a number of security issues views differ considerably among members of the Western community.

The Future of Western Strategy

A debate on the credibility of Western deterrence has been initiated in the United States. Henry Kissinger, with his

Brussels speech of early September 1979, became the most outspoken critic of the present strategy. The argument that he and others present is twofold:

- In their view, the strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction, i.e. mutual extinction of societies as the basis of nuclear strategy and the implied vulnerability of society as a prerequisite of deterrence, appears less and less credible as a rational security policy.

- The Soviet Union is modernizing its ICBM force in such a way as to be able to destroy with only a part of its arsenal the American land-based ICBM force. Under such conditions of asymmetry and Soviet first strike capability, Henry Kissinger asserts, the threat of a self-destruction of the United States in order to deter a Soviet attack is no longer credible. All the more so, he argues, since there exists a considerable imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union in the field of middle-range nuclear weapons in Europe.

A far-reaching conclusion has been drawn from these assertions—namely, that the Europeans should cease to have full confidence in the capacity of the United States to deter an attack on their territory.

While there are serious problems involved in maintaining a stable balance of deterrence, there is no reason to proclaim the end of a strategy that has secured peace for three decades or to replace a sober view of the matter by an overly alarmist approach.

The West has to face two particularly important problems in the field of strategy. First, the growing imbalance in middle-range weapons, due to Soviet deployment of the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber, requires on the part

of the West correction by a mixture of theater modernization and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. Without such measures, it becomes conceivable that, in an actual crisis later in the 1980s, the Soviet Union might calculate that a U.S. president is inhibited from escalating. In this sense deterrence could be undermined. It is precisely to avoid such an outcome that the NATO Alliance is moving toward modernization of its nuclear weapons in conjunction with a new set of arms control negotiations.

Second, the vulnerability of the U.S. ICBM force will certainly exist for several years. But once the mobile MX system is deployed in the U.S., that vulnerability will decrease and the balance will soon be reversed in favor of the United States. In effect, the Soviet Union will then have to face the very problems the U.S. has to deal with during the next few years.

A pessimistic view of the future simply overlooks some facts which suggest different conclusions. First, the strategy of flexible response remains a reality to which the entire force structure and contingency planning of NATO have been geared for years. An argument which suggests the ineffectiveness of deterrence as a result of the alleged inability of the U.S. to accept a central strategic nuclear war assumes that the first stages of escalation in a crisis will be by-passed, or that flexible response does not work. However, such an assertion is not borne out by the reality of NATO, let alone by the fact that no American president is likely to remain passive once U.S. troops have been attacked and are involved in fighting.

Second, to assert that U.S. deterrence lacks credibility is to neglect the issue of America's second strike capability. It is hard to understand the alarmist tone present in the American debate. At the moment, the U.S. has more than twice as many warheads as the Soviet Union. To be sure, the Soviet Union is slowly modifying that balance in her favor and acquiring a capacity to eliminate the U.S. land-based ICBM force. But even in the hardly imaginable event of an all-out attack and the destruction of all American land-based ICBMs, the 656 U.S. submarine-launched missiles with their 6,000 warheads and the 2,600 nuclear weapons in airborne U.S. bombers would deliver such catastrophic destruction on the Soviet Union as to make her cease to function as a political and social system. It is hard to understand why the Soviet leaders could avoid contemplating such consequences and therefore being deterred from any large-scale use of nuclear weapons.

The credibility of deterrence is as much a matter of psychology and trust as of military hardware and should be treated with the utmost care and rationality. That applies in particular to the delicate question of American credibility for Europe's defense. There is nothing in the present problems of deterrence that cannot be solved through American or Western action. An open challenge to American credibility contributes to a psychological decoupling of Western Europe

from the United States, and that is the last thing Americans and Europeans want now or in the future.

Europe and SALT II

The American Senate and the foreign policy community in the United States have submitted the SALT II agreement to an examination of unprecedented intensity. It is often overlooked that Europe had a SALT debate as well; it may have been less intensive and less centered on technical details, but it focused nevertheless on all relevant military and political dimensions. While there was a certain divergence of views at the beginning of the public debate on SALT in Europe, it is important to note that, as a result of this debate, something like a European consensus in favor of SALT has emerged.

Some of the concerns which were voiced notably by the political opposition in some countries with regard to the non-extension of the protocol, the necessary measures on theater nuclear weapons modernization and non-circumvention have been allayed either by political developments such as the gradual movement of the Alliance toward modernization of nuclear weapons or by the debate in the United States and the understandings which the U.S. Senate appears likely to attach to the SALT agreement.

Today, European statesmen, for example in meetings between President Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor Schmidt and Prime Minister Thatcher, or through the common position of Europe's foreign ministers, have given their public endorsement to SALT and expressed their desire to see the agreement ratified. Even the opposition parties in European NATO countries have by now endorsed SALT in principle.

From the European perspective, a rejection of SALT would have serious implications:

- 1) Since all of America's allies support the agreement, non-ratification by the Senate amounts to a rejection of a unified allied position. It is hard to imagine that such an act would not undermine transatlantic cohesion.

- 2) A rejection of an agreement into which many years of extraordinarily extensive work have been invested by two world powers would represent a major blow to calculability in international relations and introduce a degree of uncertainty which can hardly be conducive to stability.

- 3) A rejection of a major international treaty on which three consecutive administrations have worked and made a major investment of manpower and creativity could seriously undermine the position of the United States as a leader of the West.

- 4) A rejection of SALT is likely to affect negatively the international environment, which has in the past been favorable to the smaller socialist states, in particular to the deepening of their relations with the non-communist world.

- 5) A non-ratification of SALT is likely to undermine the position of those forces in the Soviet leadership that have tried to pursue an accommodating policy with the West. One

could not exclude that such a rejection might work in favor of a hawkish successor or successor-team once Brezhnev disappears from the scene.

The Brezhnev Proposals

At the beginning of October 1979, Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, in an important speech delivered in East Berlin, made a number of proposals related to the ongoing security debate within the West and between East and West. First, he proposed to reduce launchers for middle-range nuclear weapons in the western part of the Soviet Union in exchange for a Western renunciation of the planned modernization of theater nuclear weapons. Second, he announced a unilateral withdrawal of up to 20,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, and other military hardware within the following twelve months. Third, he proposed a number of confidence-building measures in the field of mutual announcement of military maneuvers and military movements.

While one can only speculate about Soviet motives for this move, some are fairly obvious: First, there must be a genuine concern within the Soviet leadership that a number of armaments measures which the West has been planning and implementing in response to Soviet armaments could have a negative impact on the Soviet Union and force her to take additional measures. Second, the slow pace, if not the stagnation, of the Vienna negotiations on troop reductions has been a constant source of publicly expressed concern and dissatisfaction. Any Soviet hopes that internal divisions within the West might prevent it from taking measures in the field of modernization of theater nuclear forces (TNF) must have been seriously reduced by the decision of the NATO Alliance within the High Level Group to propose the production and deployment of 572 cruise missiles and Pershing II in Western Europe; and by the decision of the leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Germany to submit a motion to its forthcoming party congress in December that suggests a simultaneous approach of defense measures and arms control in the field of TNF modernization.

In responding to the Brezhnev proposals a difference should be made between the three areas upon which they touch. In proposing negotiations on *middle-range nuclear weapons* Brezhnev does not raise a new issue, for he made such a proposal earlier in 1979. Moreover, he anticipates a negotiation offer by the West, since the NATO Alliance, besides agreeing on armaments measures in the field of TNF, is more or less agreed on an arms control proposal in the same field which was prepared in the so-called Special Group.

While the *principle* of negotiation on middle-range nuclear weapons corresponds to a Western consensus, the proposed formula contains two fundamental flaws: First, by focusing on *launchers* rather than missiles or warheads, the proposal chooses a category which is inherently advantageous to the Soviet Union. When Brezhnev contends in his

speech that the Soviet Union slightly reduced the number of its launchers during the last ten years, he passes over in silence the simple but important fact that about a hundred obsolete SS-4s and SS-5s with one warhead have been replaced by the modern and mobile SS-20 with three warheads.

Second, Brezhnev's proposal to reduce the number of launchers in exchange for a complete Western renunciation of any deployment of new middle-range weapons contains a basic asymmetry: Under this formula, the Soviet Union could replace its 590 SS-4 and SS-5 launchers by modern SS-20s; and by offering, for example, a reduction of one third of the launchers it could still double the number of its warheads and modernize its missile arsenal by introducing the mobile SS-20 while the West would be forced to total inactivity. More important, perhaps, since Brezhnev only refers to the western part of the Soviet Union as an area for reduction, he leaves open the possibility of moving the missiles to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union where they would continue to be usable against targets in Western Europe.

Finally, the Brezhnev formula of a total freeze of the existing potential on the Western side while a modernization and increase of warheads can go on on the Eastern side is at variance with the growing consensus in the West that the existing imbalance in the field of middle-range weapons must be addressed by a combination of military measures and arms control negotiations. Any postponement of defense measures until Soviet intentions have been sounded out in arms control negotiations not only allows the Soviet Union to continue her own modernization, but offers her a possibility to insure inactivity on the Western side by simply prolonging the negotiations.

In responding to the Brezhnev proposal in the field of TNF modernization, the West should therefore welcome the principle of negotiations as corresponding to its own priorities while firmly rejecting the proposed formula as a basis for negotiations. Since Brezhnev related his own offer of a reduction to the "stationing" of weapons rather than to a "decision" by the NATO allies, the West can interpret the proposal as offering time for negotiations between a Western decision on middle-range weapons and the actual deployment of these weapons.

Among Brezhnev's proposals, his announcement of a *unilateral withdrawal of troops, tanks, and military hardware* came as an unexpected and unusual move. While the West had been expecting for some time a Soviet initiative in the field of middle-range nuclear weapons, the decision in the conventional field came as a surprise. The proposal is unusual because it represents the first substantial unilateral act of troops disarmament in recent history which is announced in the context of an arms control proposal. (This move therefore substantially differs from Washington's unilateral renunciation of two weapons systems, the B-1 bomber

and the neutron bomb, as well as the thinning out of troops in Europe which the U.S. implemented twice after World War II.)

Although the withdrawal of 20,000 soldiers amounts to only 5 per cent of the Soviet troops in this area and although the withdrawal of 1,000 tanks only marginally reduces the tank superiority of the Warsaw Pact, the proposed withdrawal nevertheless represents a substantial and important move. After all, the planned reduction amounts to 30 percent of the troop reduction which the West proposed in its last negotiation offer in the context of the Vienna negotiations on troop reductions, while the planned tank withdrawal amounts to 60 percent of the reduction of tanks which the West proposed to the Warsaw Pact.

Although the formula of withdrawing "up to 20,000 troops, etc ..." leaves a door open for non-implementation, the proposed move must have caused considerable debate within the Soviet military, which has an inherent tendency to aim for military over-insurance. This measure should therefore be welcomed as an important gesture to break the deadlock in East-West arms control. Since Brezhnev did not mention the Vienna negotiations, it must remain open whether the proposed measures are related to them.

Finally, Brezhnev's proposals on *confidence-building measures* can only be welcomed by the West, which has for some time attempted to convince the East to move in this direction. Moreover, the proposals single out important areas on which the forthcoming follow-up conference of the C.S.C.E.* could establish a consensus between East and West.

In sum, the Brezhnev proposals deserve to be taken seriously since his announcement of a troop withdrawal and suggestions on confidence-building measures can only be welcomed. Although his proposal on middle-range nuclear weapons is clearly aimed at preventing Western measures in this field, the West would be well-advised to accept the principle of negotiation while rejecting the proposed formula. An acceptance of Brezhnev's nuclear offer in its present form would seriously undermine Western security, but an all-out rejection of negotiations would seriously endanger the emerging consensus in the West—and in particular in West European domestic politics—that a simultaneous move is necessary towards both modernization of theater nuclear weapons and negotiations with the Soviet Union.

The Future of Détente

Disagreement increasingly becomes visible between Alliance members on both the necessity and the content of détente policy.

Few would question the *necessity of détente*. In fact, everybody is for it. But at closer analysis it turns out that the

consensus established in NATO since the Harmel exercise assigning to security the double dimension of both defense and détente is clearly suffering from erosion. An often fundamental skepticism is hidden behind such formulas as the necessity of a "realistic" or "balanced" détente rather than an allegedly "illusory" détente exerting Western concessions without counterpart.

The arguments pro and con cannot be examined here in detail. Of course, détente has produced numerous positive results, and, of course, it has failed to bring progress in numerous other areas. The point here is that a relatively large number of politicians and analysts, more in the U.S. than in Europe, question détente in principle. If the Alliance consensus on détente continues to erode, the consequences can be disastrous, for nothing less than the legitimacy of the Alliance in large sectors of the public in numerous countries is at stake.

If the issue of peace and of improving relations with the East is left to the Warsaw Pact countries, the Alliance will lose support in large sectors of the younger generation and among liberals and the left.

Of course, a détente policy which is little more than an alibi to keep up the morale will fail as well. The issues of the East-West conflict are too serious and the destructive power of modern armaments too considerable to entrust the West's future to a policy which treats security exclusively as a matter of defense.

The *content of détente policy* is controversial as well. A growing difference in emphasis arises out of different situations and perceptions between the U.S. and Western Europe. The American conception of dealing with the East is global in perspective, more competitive, more dominated by the conflict with the Soviet Union and more focused on military and strategic issues—the only non-military issue area really taken seriously is the problem of Jewish emigration from Russia.

The West European concept of détente is more Europe-centered, covers a larger spectrum of issues such as trade, investment, and tourism, although, of course, the military element is present as well. While the Soviet Union is most relevant, West Europeans assign a more important role to smaller East European countries than does the U.S.

These differences in perspective are natural, legitimate and, indeed, inevitable. They are perhaps most noticeable between the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany, which, unlike her allies, has a second German State to be concerned with. But in essence there is a general emphasis in détente policy which Europeans share despite internal variations. Such a common view became visible, for example, in their critical perception of the Carter Administration's handling of the human rights issue.

These differences can become erosive. That will be the case when every effort to secure progress in détente is interpreted as being extorted by the Soviets or every concilia-

* Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

tory or moderating posture vis-à-vis the East is considered as evidence of "self-finlandization." To be sure, Europeans, and in particular Germans, who have the greatest stake in détente, must be aware that a line must be drawn between an active posture of détente and a disposition towards unacceptable Soviet positions. Moreover, every progress in détente policy creates a vested interest in its continuation, particularly when human beings are involved, on the issues of travelling, emigration or jobs, for instance. Inevitably such progress can potentially be used by the Soviet Union to put

pressure on the beneficiary of her good will, if not to exploit that interest in the continuation of specific détente policies for her own interest. But there is no reason to believe that West European leadership is not aware of these dangers and necessities.

If the existing difference of conception increasingly polarizes between those who equate détente with appeasement and those who consider adequate defense as an outmoded cold war stance, the Alliance would suffer from erosion.



The Military Balance In Northeast Asia

by Takuya Kubo



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The political and military interests of the four great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, China and Japan, are closely intertwined in Northeast Asia. This region is the home of divided Korea, the by-product of cold war, and of Taiwan, the orphan of the Chinese revolution. It is also a focal region in the global strategies of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Of particular importance is the continuing political and military tension in the Korean peninsula.

Comparative Military Power

The military balance in Northeast Asia is maintained largely by the forces of the U.S. and USSR stationed both around the world and in Asia and the Pacific. Since the 1960s, the Soviet Union has been gradually building up its military power, both in scale and quality, and this applies to its armed forces deployed in the Far East as well. Especially in the 1970s, the time lag between the updating of its arms in Europe and those in the Far East has tended to diminish. The following chart provides a glimpse of the extent of the Soviet military build-up in East Asia.

Growing Soviet Military Strength in East Asia

	1968	1978
Principal surface combatants	55	70
General purpose submarines	90	80
Patrol combatants	20	25
Navy aircraft		
Bombers	105	95
Antisubmarine warfare	70	115
Tactical air		
Fighters	500	1,350
Bombers	295	320

(Report of the Pacific Study Group to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S.A., "United States-Japan Security Relationship: The Key to East Asian Security and Stability," March, 1979.)

Although Sino-Soviet relations did not develop into armed confrontation before 1968, the USSR had then about 15 army divisions stationed on the Sino-Soviet border. By the beginning of the seventies, however, its forces had been increased to over 40 divisions. In 1979 the build-up has been marked by the stationing of the new-type aircraft carrier *Minsk* in the Far East and the deployment of the long-range Backfire bombers. In addition, ever since the Sino-Vietnam war, Soviet warships and aircraft have become frequent visitors to military bases in Vietnam. It is safe to assume that this military build-up will continue steadily from now on.

U.S. forces deployed in Asia and the Pacific include 10 squadrons of tactical fighters, 1 squadron of B-52s, 2 army divisions, 2 regiments of marines, 6 aircraft carriers, 79

surface vessels, 34 conventional attack submarines, and 10 SSBNs (ballistic missile-carrying submarines), all of which are continually being modernized and updated. The scale and quality of these military forces, according to U.S. military authorities, is the absolute minimum necessary for the defense of the U.S. mainland and the security of this region. They claim that in an emergency it will be difficult for these forces alone to secure the vital sea and air lanes between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and that in order to keep pace with the continuing Soviet military build-up in the region, the U.S. must keep expanding its forces throughout the 1980s.

A Pentagon reevaluation of North Korean military capability as of the spring of 1979 points to a drastic increase in the strength of its land forces. The North reportedly now has between 38 and 41 divisions deployed as against the 20 divisions of South Korea, and it is believed that the firepower of the North is several times greater than that of the South. In terms of the ability to sustain prolonged conflict, South Korea may have the advantage of superior national strength, but Seoul is dangerously close to the DMZ and the country's air defense capability remains inadequate; because of these weak points, the South is still vulnerable to a surprise attack from the North leading to a short-term, limited war. The increased military strength of the North and lingering vulnerability of the South have made the proposed withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea controversial, but as far as the military strengths of North and South Korea are concerned, it appears that a balance can be achieved by the latter half of the 1980s.

In the case of Taiwan, the number of divisions deployed against it by the People's Republic of China decreased from more than 10 divisions in the late 1950s to less than 10 divisions in the mid-1960s, the level maintained even today. Perhaps this suggests what China's intentions are vis-à-vis Taiwan for the immediate future, but the military balance between the two cannot be properly judged only in terms of the Chinese forces deployed against Taiwan. More relevant is the level of China's naval strength, since any Chinese attack on Taiwan must be carried out by sea.

Japan relies heavily on U.S. military support provided through the mutual security treaty, but its own defense capability is far from adequate to cope with any full-scale attack by the Soviet Union. Within the strategic context of the Asian and Pacific region, however, Japan's military might is at most a nuisance for the Soviet Union, while for the U.S. it is beginning to play a reinforcing role for American forces in the area. Of crucial importance is the contribution Japan is making to U.S. strategy and the general stability of the region by allowing American military bases on its soil.

Factors in the Military Balance

While a numerical comparison of military forces in the states confronting each other may reveal important factors in the

balance, it does not portray a truly accurate picture. The roles assigned to U.S. and Soviet military forces in Asia and the Pacific are different, and asymmetrical in both scale and nature, so that a simple comparison of figures is almost meaningless. Rather, insofar as they both maintain military strength capable of achieving their mission and prevent each other from any successful attack, one must conclude that a fair degree of military balance is maintained between them. Moreover, there are many factors which determine the actual level of military strength, without an examination of which no discussion of the military balance is meaningful. Let me touch briefly on some of those factors.

From the point of view of Soviet global strategy, Europe is the main theater which requires strategic offense capability, while East Asia is a kind of hinterland, where strategic defense and tactical offense capabilities must be maintained. Given the dual nature of the Soviet military forces in East Asia, the USSR considers that a military balance exists in the region when its forces have reached the level where they can perform those strategic and tactical functions vis-à-vis U.S. military forces there.

In terms of U.S. global strategy, the Asian and Pacific region is a stage for active operations which, in a concerted action with Europe, seek to contain Soviet military power. Within that strategic framework, Northeast Asia is the key area of the Asia and Pacific region, and a balance of power there requires military strength sufficient to prevent the southward advance of the socialist forces and the expansion of Soviet military power, as well as to insure the security of the U.S. and its allies. To judge whether the military strength of the U.S. and the Soviet Union is, in fact, at the necessary level, we must examine yet another set of factors.

China's moves have great significance for the balance of military power between the East and the West. Since the Sino-Soviet confrontation escalated to military proportions in the late 1960s, it has become a major constraint on Soviet Asian strategy. Meanwhile, this military confrontation and China's overtures toward the West, based on its recent policy of the Four Modernizations, have given the Western powers, particularly the United States, a clear strategic advantage in Asia. China has not only ceased to be a potential enemy, but has come to serve as a significant check on Soviet military power.

Some believe it is possible that confrontation between China and the Soviet Union might ease, although perhaps only partially, during the 1980s. But, in the opinion of this writer, as long as the U.S.-Soviet conflict, the Soviet military build-up abroad and the inferiority of Chinese military power vis-à-vis the Soviet Union continue, it is difficult to envision the disappearance of military confrontation though there might be some limited relaxation of tension. To the extent that China is opposed to the Soviet Union, its policies and actions will certainly contribute to the Western military balance in Asia.

Any sort of U.S.-China-Japan cooperation which might be attempted to counter what China claims is the Soviet pursuit of "hegemony" in Asia is certain to heighten both political and military tensions in the region and aggravate relations among the great powers in general. For the West, it would be unwise to contemplate such an alliance. Quite apart from the official charges made by the Soviet Union, neither the U.S. nor Japan is moving in that direction.

Since the Vietnam war ended, the U.S. has become increasingly selective in its fulfillment of commitments in Asia, and the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 still provides the basic framework for its overall Asia policy. Since the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China, Taiwan's political and military importance has greatly diminished. Nevertheless, the U.S. intention to continue its commitments in Asia has apparently not faded, as evidenced by certain government actions and by continuing U.S. military presence in Asia. However, beset by serious economic difficulties both at home and abroad, the American people are beginning to take a negative attitude toward honoring a commitment which throws an unproportionately heavy burden on the U.S. Provided that public opinion is a major controlling factor of U.S. foreign policy, the changing attitudes of the American people will, in turn, have significant psychological impact on Asian countries, as well as considerable effect on the strategic balance in the Asian region. Fully aware of this danger, the American government will increasingly demand that its Asian allies, including Japan, adjust their economic relations with the U.S. and share a greater portion of the defense burden. In all likelihood, however, Asian willingness to comply with the U.S. demands will fall short of the expectations of the American people in this regard. Whether the U.S. can uphold the credibility of its commitments in the 1980s will thus depend both on the efforts of its allies and on the ability of the U.S. government to persuade the American people of the importance of long-range national interests, as opposed to short-term personal or corporate interests.

With regard to the political stability of the countries in the Asian and the Pacific region, it seems clear that throughout the 1980s, little change will occur in Japan and Taiwan. As far as Japan is concerned, it will continue to follow a conservative line or a moderate course based on a compromise between the conservatives and middle-of-the-roaders, and its security policy will not undergo any significant change. Meanwhile, Japan's cooperation with the U.S. in military affairs will, if very slowly, continue to improve in both quality and quantity.

Such optimistic hopes for political stability do not apply to South Korea, however. The rapid economic growth of that nation contains many internal contradictions which might be brought to the surface by an unfavorable international economic environment, and we cannot discard the possibility that the negative effects of those contradictions,

combined with the anti-Park forces which claim that human rights are being suppressed, might bring social unrest in South Korea to the boiling point. Such events could, in turn, aggravate the military tensions which exist in the peninsula. Yet, even if considerable change should occur in the domestic situation in South Korea, it is not likely that the Korean people's anti-Communist posture and preference for cooperation with America will change, nor would it fundamentally affect the basic strategic arrangement between the U.S. and South Korea.

At present, in no area of Northeast Asia are there any conditions that might be conducive to military attack from either side, and no nation seems to harbor aggressive intentions. The Korean peninsula is the area where trouble could most easily be provoked. South Korea is militarily weaker than the North, and Seoul and other major cities are extremely vulnerable. Therefore, if the U.S. makes its intention to support the defense of Korea clear, including the readiness to provide emergency assistance from outside the region, the balance of military power with the North can be sustained. In this sense, it was wise to freeze the plan to withdraw U.S. troops stationed in Korea, since that might have led the North to believe that a new situation was developing in the peninsula.

With respect to the military forces of the U.S. and the Soviet Union which sustain the balance in Northeast Asia, several problems exist both geopolitically and strategically. Insofar as the U.S. considers Europe and the Atlantic as priority areas in its global strategy, the question of how many of its military forces to station in Asia and the Pacific keeps recurring. Compared with the Soviet Union, whose troops in the Far East seem quite independent from the forces in the European front, the U.S. obviously intends to deal with an emergency through mobile, dynamic troop operations. Thus, the level of mobility in troop operations determines the American capability to effectively maintain a military parity in Northeast Asia.

Though the U.S. pledges back-up support to Northeast Asia, the region is far removed from the American mainland, and sending the large number of troops, arms, ammunition and other supplies needed to provide the support for an emergency would be extremely difficult. Unlike Europe, there are many complications in establishing arms stockpiles for future use. A new war, should it break out, will be fought under much different conditions than the Korean or Vietnam wars, which were waged with massive mobilization of troops and arms. In any case, the timely intervention of U.S. troops on a massive scale would surely be difficult, a factor which the strategic and military defense preparations of Japan and South Korea must take into account.

The Soviet Union has a great advantage in self-defense because of the vastness and depth of its territory, and its striking power against adjacent regions is formidable. On the other hand, Soviet naval power, based primarily in the Japan

Sea, cannot be deployed in oceans away from home save by passing through crucial straits. The Soviet Union possesses no secure major naval bases abroad, and it does not appear that such bases will be provided in the future. Meanwhile, the Soviet army and air forces must be constantly wary of China. Supply lines between the Asian and European fronts are long and vulnerable. From a global strategic perspective, these are weak points for the Soviet Union.

Maintaining the Military Balance

As I have suggested, a combination of factors contribute to the military balance between the East and the West, making it impossible to explain in numerical terms alone. Nevertheless, insofar as each possesses military power sufficient to avoid being easily destroyed should the other initiate armed attack, to the extent that many built-in restraints put a brake on the initiation of such armed attack, and as long as the military situation in Northeast Asia must be assessed in connection with the global strategies of the U.S., China and the Soviet Union, then both sides will probably assume that a balance of military power exists in this region. If deterrence is a question of psychological checks on the use of military power, military balance may likewise be a question of perception by both sides that they cannot make the first move without fear of annihilation.

With regard to military power, despite the asymmetry of U.S. and Soviet military capability, if one side believes it has achieved preponderance over the other, it is likely to think it can act more freely. For example, should the U.S. reduce its fleets of aircraft carriers and submarines stationed in Asia and the Western Pacific and withdraw all the Marines and B-52s, the Soviet Union would not necessarily take it to mean that its defense burden in the region had been reduced, thereby allowing it to shift superfluous forces to Europe. Rather, the Kremlin is more likely to interpret reduced American military presence as giving the Soviet navy greater freedom of action in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

For the free world countries in Asia, the presence of U.S. troops is seen as visible evidence of continuing U.S. interest and willingness to cooperate in the region. If the U.S. continues to reduce its forces in Asia slowly, if not drastically, Asian nations will grow suspicious of America's intention to honor its commitments. Eventually, movements will begin both toward more self-reliant defense on the one

hand and toward accommodation with the Soviet Union on the other. China, too, may follow this pattern, but such movements will invite instability to Northeast Asia and the entire region, thus upsetting the existing strategic balance. The U.S. will try to justify reduction of its troop strength in Asia by assuring the dispatch of mobile troops in case of emergency, but no such explanations will be convincing enough for individual Asian nations to change their perception of the imbalance.

One of the greatest fears of Asian nations today is how domestic opinion trends in the U.S. will be reflected in American foreign policy. If the American people strongly tend to put their own immediate, domestic interests ahead of international affairs, Asian nations will come to doubt the U.S. intention to fulfill its commitment despite the presence of U.S. troops in Asia, causing these nations to turn to other ways of guaranteeing their security, as mentioned above. In this sense, American domestic opinion has the power to influence which options Asian countries will take.

On the other hand, the pro-Western countries of Northeast Asia are part of the problem as well. If the military balance in Northeast Asia is to be maintained, each power in the region must recognize its responsibility to fill the gaps in order to preserve the equilibrium, and must be fully aware that U.S. military power is not omnipotent. At the same time, each nation must strive to reduce the potential threat to its security. More specifically, South Korea will have to adjust its policies toward North Korea, and Japan must endeavor not to antagonize the Soviet Union.

Both in global and regional terms, the military balance is being maintained through the continual escalation of military power on both sides. While for the present this may be unavoidable, it is not a desirable trend at all. Somehow the balance of expanding military power must be shifted in the direction of a balance of shrinking military power. Although talks on arms control between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Europe and in the Indian Ocean are, albeit with excruciating slowness, moving ahead, there is unfortunately no sign of developments leading to talks on the particular conditions of Northeast Asia. In the 1980s we can hope for progress in negotiations for extensive arms control aimed at SALT III. It is now high time that real and serious consideration of the problems faced in Northeast Asia be undertaken by all parties concerned.



*"Economics First"; The Pacific
Basin Concept; A Handicapped Diplomacy;*

Japan's National Security Reappraised

by Toru Yano



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Post-Vietnam war international society no longer rests on the simple maintenance of mutual deterrence through superior military might that marked U.S.-Soviet relations in the fifties and sixties. It is increasingly governed by a complex and intricate web of diplomatic maneuvers reminiscent of the international scene and style of foreign relations in the nineteenth century. The world may soon witness a marked revival of aspects of diplomacy such as geopolitics, balance of power, and even localized conflicts similar to the recent Sino-Vietnam war.

Classical Diplomacy Revisited

The future course of international society warrants no optimism or wishful thinking. Given the apparent revival of the classical principles of diplomacy, the advanced industrial powers will have to tread with utter caution in determining their course of action. Military power, particularly massive nuclear power, will lose its significance as an effective means of diplomacy; what counts will be the keen diplomatic sensitivity and finesse that distinguished classical foreign rela-

tions. Whether a nation has these qualities or not will determine its ability to cope with the increasingly intricate international situation. In the case of Japan, its rigid internal institutions and the immature diplomatic sense among the people make the nation particularly ill-fitted for the conduct of diplomatic relations in the classical sense. Because of these liabilities Japan will almost certainly find it difficult to steer through the complexities and intricacies of international affairs.

From now on, it is more likely that the threat of world war will fade, while localized conflicts and regional disputes such as those in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia become chronic. Under these conditions, what can be even more fatal for Japan, which depends for its survival on a peaceful international environment, will be its inability to anticipate the course of history and prepare for it. Quite bluntly, Japan does not have the kind of political leadership that can foresee a crisis and make needed institutional changes or educate the people in how to deal with it rationally. Rather, as often pointed out by foreign critics, Japan's diplomacy has no consistent guiding principle; it is at best a skill at adapting to circumstances, at worst a series of stopgap measures to deal with diplomatic crises as they arise. This "policy without principle" may have worked in the past, but it seems to have lost its usefulness.

Recently the question of Japan's diplomatic bargaining power has become the focus of growing interest. It is perhaps worth the effort to clarify the nature of Japan's bargaining power and consider how it can be strengthened. Japan's bargaining power obviously derives from its ability to sus-

tain a steady export volume and high technological standards, as well as to supply basic processed materials, including steel. But at the same time, the nature of that bargaining power contains built-in pitfalls. For in exercising its bargaining power, Japan inevitably incurs the displeasure of other countries in some form or another. For example, Japan intends to increase its imports of primary products from the developing countries, and it is widely believed that this will strengthen Japan's bargaining power. Yet increasing its purchasing power means that should Japan encounter a serious recession, it would lose that purchasing power, inviting not only complaints from its trading partners, but confusion in their economies. Far from augmenting its bargaining power, Japan would only forfeit points in the diplomatic game. Therefore, one must not talk lightly of bargaining power, but consider it with extreme care from all possible perspectives.

In any case, the Japanese people as a whole must cultivate the ability to anticipate the future course of history. In this age of growing internationalization and interdependence among states, problems quickly spread among nations, but it is not a genuine internationalization in which nations will help each other to avert difficulties in the case of crisis. Rather, when a crisis occurs, it will spread quickly to many countries, but the security of individual states will not necessarily be guaranteed by international mechanisms. Here is one of the ironies of international politics.

The Pacific Basin Concept

When Masayoshi Ohira took over the government late in the fall of 1978, its policy position was unclear. Foreign policy, in particular, was and is even today little more than a collection of vague, ill-defined plans. Among them, Ohira's "Pacific Basin concept" is conspicuous by its relative clarity. Since he has formally announced the idea, it appears to be meant as the pivot of Ohira's foreign policy, albeit with some changes in form and content as it is implemented.

However, certain characteristics of the Pacific region convince me that it is very difficult to be optimistic about the feasibility of Ohira's concept. To begin with, a mysterious magnetic field seems to exist in this region in which an action may have a positive economic value while its political and diplomatic repercussions are bound to be negative. In essence, the international system in the Pacific Basin contains a basic dichotomy between the political and economic systems within it, the gap between which is considerable. Moreover, on the periphery of the Pacific Basin are socialist countries whose relationship to the area is as yet an unknown factor.

In recent events are many examples of the instability that continues to prevail in international relations: the unrest in Iran, the economic friction among the advanced industrial nations of the West, the conflict between China and the Soviet Union as manifested in the Indochina situation and in

covert and overt political operations by the Soviet Union in the Middle East and in Africa. The symptoms of instability persist in relations between the big powers, and the conflicts between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and China have yet to be lessened. As long as such conditions persist, it will be difficult to say that international relations as a whole are becoming more stable.

On the other hand, looking at international relations from an entirely different angle, states are clearly becoming more dependent upon one another. Interdependence will grow in economic relations and in terms of energy and resources. Even the U.S. and the Soviet Union, while they continue their military and ideological confrontation, seem to be groping toward greater economic and technological cooperation. From this point of view, the future appears to be bright.

The division of a single international system into economic and political systems in which each presents a totally different picture and has only limited effects upon the other is nothing new. But in the Pacific Basin, the discrepancy is particularly remarkable. This is in itself a curious phenomenon, but a more important fact is that for various reasons, this separation is likely to continue for many years to come. Nevertheless, the U.S. and the Soviet Union and other countries seem capable of handling the situation with sophisticated diplomatic acumen.

The irony of the Pacific region is that, while economic interdependence is now an established fact, blatantly political discord, which totally lacks economic rationality, is simultaneously emerging, as illustrated by the Indochina situation. The same may be said of the situation in the Korean peninsula. Using the popular phraseology of "hegemony," we can describe the situation in Southeast Asia as an "endless chain of hegemonic relations," or an international system devoid of economic rationality. Indeed, what Vietnam and Cambodia are doing runs counter to their goal of creating the foundations for economic development.

There is no guarantee that the growing confusion in Indochina will not spread to one or more of the ASEAN countries. In considering any plans for the Pacific Basin, therefore, it does not work to treat the region simply as an economic system, especially when the region is filled with problems both in international relations and in the domestic situation of individual Asian nations.

In today's world, a precondition for being a big power is the ability to play a leading role in the construction, management and maintenance of either one or both of these systems. Of course, it does not necessarily follow that all the advanced industrial nations will choose for themselves the task for which they are best suited. When a nation without political power tries recklessly to take initiatives in the political sphere, it not only brings disaster upon itself, but causes unnecessary disruption of the system and degrades the level of international relations in the region.

Japanese Diplomacy in the "Age of Uncertainty"

As Sino-Japanese relations have grown closer, the predominantly economic orientation of Japan's foreign policy is becoming clearer. Unlike the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Japan does not engage in a diplomacy of ideology, nor can it get its way by virtue of military might. Likewise, it has no intention or talent for world management. Unable to take a comprehensive approach to the duality of the present international system, Japan has chosen to concentrate just on the system of economic interdependence.

For Japan the Pacific Basin is the central stage for its economic diplomacy, which revolves around relations with China and Southeast Asia. According to its tenets, it is only natural for Japan to deepen its economic ties with Peking, while at the same time strengthening its economic relations with anti-Peking countries such as Vietnam and Taiwan. In the August 1977 Manila Declaration, Japan declined to join the major military powers and stated its intention to remain a purely economic superpower. It was an official admission that the economic system is the only international system Japanese diplomacy is capable of handling. In that sense, the Manila Declaration held greater significance than implied by its surface statement on policy toward Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, this kind of economy-oriented foreign policy has its intrinsic problems. For example, it provokes the distrust of other great powers such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union which do not believe in the separation of approaches to the political and economic systems. Japan thus is accused by America of getting a "free ride" on security and by the USSR and other countries of practicing a pernicious opportunism. In addition, Japan's economic diplomacy cannot obtain the support of people both inside and outside the country who want to see Japan play a major role in non-economic spheres as well. After all, not everyone in Asia is convinced that all matters are economically oriented and those who evaluate Japanese diplomacy in terms of "Japan's political mission" are rapidly growing in number. From their point of view, Japan's present diplomacy is disgraceful.

In orienting its foreign policy towards the economy alone Japan must take ample care to keep its economic power peaceful and creative. In this respect, Japanese diplomacy still cannot pass muster. Moreover, to give the Japanese people something to dream about and to satisfy their romanticism, it is going to take much more than the simple materialism of economic diplomacy.

From the point of view of security, however, it may well be said that Japan's "economics first" approach is, for the present, the most prudent. If Japan can persuade China and the USSR that it is more to their advantage to stay on friendly terms for economic reasons than to militarily invade it, such a course is laudable in terms of national security. It is indeed intriguing that our economic diplomacy is taking a

firm root just when the debate on strengthening Japan's self-defense capability is growing more intense.

Still, Japan's choice of systems is not yet entirely clear. What kind of "great power" will Japan choose to become? The next four or five years will be the hardest in making such a new national choice. In the Pacific Basin concept is one manifestation of Japan's groping for change in its approach to foreign policy.

Until recently, John Galbraith's *The Age of Uncertainty* was popular reading in Japan and its title has become a household word. When applied to our foreign policy in its broadest sense, the expression is fearfully apt. For the Japanese people, the utmost priority in foreign policy is the maintenance of national security, but in the contemporary international scene, the path to that goal is paved with "uncertainty."

In judging the strength or weakness of nations, from now on those who suffer most from "uncertainty" in the international environment will be called weak. Japan, in many ways, belongs to the countries that so suffer, while America is among those that are practically immune.

The tragedy of Japan is that, unequipped to foresee the future course of history, it becomes victim of the strong current of international politics and eventually abandons itself to an erratic course, steering in and out of events as they come along. The further irony is that, though blessed with a unique position to bargain in international affairs, Japan is prevented from using that power effectively. For example, the rising value of the yen has provided Japan with a strong and leading currency, but it has never been able to take advantage of that strength, finding itself faced instead with severe criticism from abroad. Moreover, as became clear when Japan lost out to Bangladesh in the election of non-permanent members to the U.N. Security Council, we are notably lacking in true "friends" or allies in international society. And events such as this gradually strengthen the Japanese sense of isolation in the world.

I cannot help thinking that Japanese still do not properly understand what it means to have an "ally" in the context of international relations. Having thrown all their chips with America through the security treaty, Japanese have developed a strange blind spot in this regard. For over a hundred years, since the beginning of the Meiji period, Japan turned away from its Asian companions and sought to "emulate Europe" in everything; yet paradoxically, this slavish devotion to the West has not helped it to communicate smoothly with the nations of Europe.

From Japan's point of view, a strong country like the U.S. appears to have a very forceful diplomatic tradition. Naturally a high-handed diplomatic stance is a quality of all big powers, and it is true that through this powerful brand of diplomacy, America has managed to mitigate the forces of "uncertainty." The lesson that diplomatic ability and "uncertainty" are closely related is not lost upon us, but the even

more serious lesson we must learn is that, in U.S.-Japan economic relations, cooperation in the real sense has not yet been achieved.

Moreover, this is true not only of Japan's relations with the U.S. and Europe. A most unfortunate characteristic that pervades international relations today is that "uncertainty" tends to push the national interest of *all* countries too far, making it impossible to achieve the fruits of successful international cooperation.

Can we not come up with a scheme to banish this sort of mutual self-centeredness and distrust? One might think this would be the stuff of summit discussions between the U.S. and Japan or at the summit of advanced industrial nations, yet this does not seem to be the case. Even the summit leaders must defend their national interests, and few of them have strong enough leadership in their own countries to be able to risk those interests for the sake of international cooperation.

Yet even if the summit leaders were to meet to consider these questions, Japan has too many disadvantages. It is too firmly held in the grip of circumstances that perpetuate "uncertainty." Alone Japan's efforts are not sufficient to overcome most of the sources of its uncertainty. Its economy

is vulnerable because it is organically tied to mechanisms outside of itself. No matter how confident of our economic talents we may be, it is impossible to forecast the future. Such is the dilemma of this "age of uncertainty," a dilemma which destines Japanese diplomacy to work at a disadvantage no matter what we do.

An even more crucial point is that Japan is now being asked whether it has contributed to the building of a New International Economic Order. Japan could have posed the same question to other countries, asking what they have done towards creating a better, more stable world order, but we were called to the witness stand first. Here again, Japan finds itself at a disadvantage, hobbled by the weakness of its diplomatic persuasion. In no other time in recent history has Japan suffered more than now from the absence of strong leadership and the weakness of persuasive power in its relations abroad. If we do not quickly acquire the skills of international negotiation with which to defend ourselves, we will eventually find that, as a non-military economic power, we have walked out on a perilous and fatal limb in terms of national security.



In the next issue of *Triologue* (Winter 1979-80)

AN ASSESSMENT OF TRI-LATERAL RELATIONS AS WE ENTER THE NEW DECADE

Summit meetings between industrialized nations: Do they work?—In the wake of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations: What comes next?—Trilateral cooperation on energy, and the problems of nuclear proliferation—Our "dialogue" with the oil producers—Domestic political trends in North America, Europe and Japan: How do they affect their cooperation?—