



ADDRESSING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:

*Prevention, Intervention and
Multilateral Cooperation*

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Report to The Trilateral Commission 2003 Annual Meeting

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The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private citizens of Europe, Japan, and North America to foster closer cooperation among these three democratic industrialized regions on common problems. It seeks to improve public understanding of such problems, to support proposals for handling them jointly, and to nurture habits and practices of working together. The European group has widened with the ongoing enlargement of the European Union. The Japanese group has widened into a Pacific Asia group. The North American group now includes members from Canada, Mexico and the United States.

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THE TRILATERAL PROCESS

The report which follows is the joint product of the three authors. They alone are responsible for the analysis, conclusions and recommendations. Joseph Nye served as lead author and author of the introductory chapter. Each of the authors has written a chapter reflecting views within his region, and all have joined in the recommendations found in Part V.

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The inspiration for the report came from a discussion during the April 7, 2002 executive committee meeting in Washington, D.C. The task force got under way later that summer. The first outline for the report was provided by Joseph Nye in the fall. That outline was agreed to as a starting point in January 2003. The first authors' meeting was held in New York on February 24, 2003 (with Paul Wilkinson participating via conference call). The authors agreed at that meeting to an overall structure of the report and each described the outline of his chapter. The authors met a final time in Seoul prior to their presentation of their draft report on April 13, 2003. Following that presentation, they met again in Seoul to discuss recommendations for a fifth and final chapter to the report. The authors decided that their report would be published before the G-8 Summit Meeting at Evian on June 1-3, 2003.

Each author conducted consultation sessions with Commission members within his region. In Europe, Paul Wilkinson met with selected European members in London on February 20, 2003. In North America, Joseph Nye held sessions in New York on February 24 and in Washington, D.C. on March 7. Each member participating had been

provided with a draft of the introductory chapter and of the North American and European chapters. In Pacific Asia, Yukio Satoh met with Pacific Asian members in Tokyo on March 18.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 created a divergence of perspectives about terrorism among the Trilateral countries. After an initial surge of solidarity illustrated by a headline in *Le Monde* declaring we were all Americans now, the differences between the United States and the other member countries began to widen. The United States declared a war on transnational terrorism, greatly increased its defense budget, fought in Afghanistan, declared a new strategy that expanded preemption into the realm of preventive war, and undertook the most massive reorganization of its government in more than half a century. Other countries, while cooperating with the United States on Afghanistan, intelligence sharing, and police work, began to express concern that the United States was overreacting. In the description of the French analyst Therese Delpech, "most Europeans do not accept the idea of a 'war' on terrorism. They are used to dealing with this phenomenon with other methods (intelligence services, police, justice)...The Europeans fear that the Americans are engaging in an endless war without considering all the possible consequences." Similar attitudes can be encountered in many parts of Asia.

It is not surprising that attitudes diverged. After all, the trauma of September 11 happened inside the United States and created a greater and longer-lasting sense of urgency. Many governments were anxious not to frighten their populations or exacerbate relations with their Muslim minorities. Some people believed that American foreign policy was, in part, responsible for the disaster and that it would be wise to seek distance from the United States. But perhaps most important was the widespread feeling of *deja vu*. Europe, Japan and other countries had lived through severe episodes of terrorism in the 1970s and 80s, yet managed to overcome it with their democracies intact. Terrorism was a nuisance that had to be managed, not a challenge requiring total change. Moreover, the political rhetoric of "evil" and "war" that helped to mobilize the American public seemed alien and alarming to many people overseas who preferred a managerial approach.

Different perceptions are natural among the different political cultures of the Trilateral countries, but if the divergence becomes too great, it can have dangerous effects. European and Asian reactions could reduce incentives for cooperation. American irritation with its allies could reinforce unilateralist responses to problems that would

benefit from more cooperative approaches. Over time, such friction could spill over into other areas such as trade and the movement of people.

Most important, diverging perceptions could limit the cooperation that is necessary to address common vulnerabilities. The simple fact that modern terrorism is transnational means no country can hope to combat it in isolation. Systems to protect against terrorism are no stronger than their weakest link, and those links are in many countries. For example, even if most countries require bars on the cockpit doors of commercial aircraft, it is impossible to prevent terrorist use of planes as giant cruise missiles unless all countries enforce such measures. "Homeland" security has become an international issue. Most governments of Trilateral countries are aware of these problems, and there has been impressive cooperation in some areas such as intelligence sharing and police work. Nonetheless, the glass is at best half full, and that is the reason that the Trilateral Commission is addressing this topic now.

Issues for Discussion

The international community has already joined in a series of efforts to coordinate action against terrorism and terrorists - their arming, financing, recruitment, training, and other means of support. At all levels - international, trilateral, regional, bilateral, and national - steps have been taken to cooperate in detecting and deterring future terrorist threats. No one would argue, however, that efforts taken to date are either comprehensive or fully effective. If, as argued above, international cooperation is essential to effective counterterrorist protections, what are the issues that must be addressed to accomplish this end?

A Common Definition ? First, it is unclear that there is shared understanding and agreement on what the international terrorist threat may be. This is not just because of the changing nature of terrorist groups like al Qaeda, but because different societies perceive the threat in different ways. For many Trilateral countries, support for counterterrorism cooperation may be unwavering, but their different views of the threat will be colored by their experiences with its actual manifestations. Any Trilateral discussion of the "new" terrorist threat, therefore, must begin with a definitional effort. Is the definition suggested in Chapter IV adequate to support the necessary cooperation?

Differing Assessments of the Threat. Terrorism will always affect individual countries differently, but can the community of nations agree on its common attributes and its capacity to do harm to global peace? In what many now view as a unipolar world, will countries gauge their contributions to antiterrorism based on the assumption that there is only one big target, the United States, and many secondary ones? Will such an assessment lead to decisions not to be too much in the forefront of fighting terrorists for fear of drawing their ire? Is it possible to compile and share across borders information about the many common vulnerabilities of today's highly linked "critical infrastructures" of the global economy? How will risks and burdens be shared?

Comparing Policies. Even if there are a number of definitions of terrorism, and differing appreciations of the threat, the effort of identifying these differences will itself be an accomplishment in both education and in cooperation. This could be built upon by conducting a comparison of the counterterrorism and homeland security policies of the Trilateral countries and regions. What would such a survey show in terms of the choices governments are making in determining necessary levels of security, in balancing security with civil liberties, in assigning roles to business, and in cooperating across national borders? Where are the weak links? How can we make more likely common approaches to protecting high vulnerability targets wherever they may be found?

Common Interests? Is it possible to arrive at a set of common vulnerabilities to terrorism by comparing different assessments and approaches to terrorism? Surely the interest all nations have in the continuity of international commerce, finance, transportation and communication constitutes one such value? What about less tangible factors such as the freedom from fear in international travel? Will the Trilateral nations see a common interest in cooperating in counterterrorism councils as a way of preserving a uniform high level of civil liberties protections for their citizens?

Institutions. At what level(s) and through which institutions can the most effective action be taken? In an arena until recently dominated by security and intelligence services, will more public education and a heightened sense of threat require greater involvement by other public officials and agencies? Will the constraints of confidentiality diminish the usefulness of some institutions with no culture of secrecy or security? How important will public education and public support for terrorism programs become in combating

terrorism? What more can be done in the realm of public diplomacy? *Protecting Civil Liberties.* Will intelligence and security services obtain broad new remits to intrude into the privacy of citizens? Will international cooperation increase or restrain the level of intrusion? For instance, will the use of private companies to perform some national security functions result in better protections for personal information they collect to protect commerce? How long will citizens of the Trilateral countries accept the diminishment of personal privacy in the name of a "war" that does not touch their daily lives? Alternatively, if insufficient steps are taken and more catastrophic attacks occur, will a wave of popular fear lead to overreaction?

Private Sector Role. The integrated nature of the global economy creates both the imperative and the remedy for effective antiterrorism policies. Yet, the nature of that economy demands that governments rely heavily on the private companies that run essential services to raise the bar for terrorist penetration or attack. What costs will counterterrorism place on these companies and what public policies will be required to assure ways to manage those costs? What protections, e.g. limitations on liability, will businesses require to undertake semi-government tasks? What are the strains inherent in asking non-government employees to assume security tasks? How should governments favor voluntary over mandatory cooperation from the private sector? Is there a cost in terms of consistency of application associated with the former that diminishes the value of minimizing government interference in the boardroom? Will increased government regulation of the private sector diminish innovation and competitiveness in the international marketplace?

Unilateralist U.S. Tendencies. It seems clear that both the dominance of the U.S. economy and its military strength will ensure antiterrorist cooperation from many Trilateral countries. Size helps solve the public goods problem. But will the United States also offer an opportunity for other governments to challenge policies the world's only superpower might otherwise embark upon without consultation of its Trilateral partners? Can the value of concerted action so enhance antiterrorist effectiveness that the United States would be deterred from acting alone if it judged that by proceeding against the wishes of its partners it would seriously diminish that cooperation? How should other Trilateral countries respond to the U.S. national security strategy and its discussion of preemption and prevention?

II. A NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

What's New?

Terrorism is not new, nor is it a single enemy. It is a long-standing method of conflict frequently defined as deliberate attack on the innocent (outside the context of *organized war*) with the objective of spreading fear and intimidation. Already in the 19th century, Joseph Conrad had drawn an indelible portrait of the terrorist mind, and terrorism was a familiar phenomenon in the 20th century. Whether homegrown or transnational, it was a staple of conflicts throughout the Middle East, in Northern Ireland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, South Africa and elsewhere. It occurred on every continent except Antarctica and affected nearly every Trilateral country. The attacks of September 11, 2001 were a dramatic escalation of an age-old phenomenon.

Terrorism today, however, is sufficiently different from the past to warrant a new approach. Until recently, the differences between allied and American attitudes towards terrorism were not that different. A number of studies pointed to new trends well before September 11, but they were often ignored. For example when the bipartisan Hart-Rudman Commission issued its warnings in the United States in March 2001, the *New York Times* did not report it nor did the White House embrace it. Yet two developments have made terrorism more lethal and more difficult to manage.

One set of trends grows out of progress in science and technology. First, there is the complex, highly technological nature of modern civilization's basic systems. As a committee of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences pointed out, market forces and openness have combined to increase the efficiency of many of our vital systems - such as those that provide transportation, information, energy and health care. But ironically such systems become more vulnerable and fragile as they become more complex and efficient. The result is that progress makes our infrastructures "vulnerable to local disruptions which could lead to widespread or catastrophic failures."¹

At the same time, progress is "democratizing technology," making the instruments of mass destruction smaller, cheaper and more readily available to a far wider range of individuals and groups. Where bombs and timers were once heavy and expensive, plastic explosives and digital timers are light and cheap. The cost of hijacking an airplane is sometimes little more than the price of a ticket.

Finally, the success of the information revolution is providing inexpensive means of communication and organization that allow groups once restricted to local and national police jurisdictions to become global in scope. Thirty years ago, instantaneous global communication was sufficiently expensive that it was restricted to large entities with large budgets like governments, multinational corporations and the Catholic Church. Today the Internet makes global communication virtually free for anyone with access to a modem.² Similarly, the Internet has reduced the costs of searching for information and making contacts related to instruments of wide-scale destruction.

The second set of trends reflects changes in the motivation and organization of terrorist groups. Terrorists in the mid-20th century tended to have relatively well-defined political objectives, which were often ill-served by mass destruction. Many were supported and covertly controlled by governments. Toward the end of the century, radical groups grew on the fringes of several religions. Most numerous were the tens of thousands of young Muslim men who went to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. There they were trained in a wide range of techniques and many were recruited to organizations with an extreme view of the religious obligation of jihad. As Walter Laqueur has observed, "traditional terrorists, whether left-wing, right-wing, or nationalist-separatists, were not greatly drawn to these opportunities for greater destruction. ...Terrorism has become more brutal and indiscriminate since then."³ This is reinforced when motivations change from political to unlimited or retributive objectives reinforced by promises of rewards in another world. Organization has also changed. For example, al Qaeda's network of tens of thousand of people in loosely affiliated cells in some 60 countries gives it a scale well beyond anything seen before. But even small networks can be more difficult to penetrate than the hierarchical quasi-military organizations of the past.

Both trends - technological and ideological - have created a new set of conditions that has increased the lethality and increased the difficulty of managing terrorism today. Because of September 11

and the unprecedented scale of al Qaeda, the current focus is properly on terrorism associated with Islamic extremists. But it would be a mistake to limit our attention or responses to Islamic terrorists, for that would ignore the wider effects of the democratization of technology and the broader set of challenges that must be met. Technological progress is putting into the hands of deviant groups and individuals destructive capabilities that were once limited primarily to governments and armies. Every large group of people has some members who deviate from the norm, and some are bent on destruction. It is worth remembering that the worst case of terrorism in the United States before September 11 was perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh, a purely homegrown anti-government fanatic. Similarly, the Aum Shinrykio cult that spread sarin in the Tokyo subway system in 1995 had nothing to do with Islam. Even if the current wave of Islamic terrorism turns out to be generational or cyclical like terrorist waves in the past, we will still have to confront the long-term secular dangers arising out of the democratization of technology.

Lethality has been increasing. In the 1970s, the Palestinian attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics or the killings by the Red Brigades galvanized world attention and cost dozens of lives. In the 1980s, Sikh extremists bombed an Air India flight and killed over 300 people. September 11 cost several thousand lives - and all of this escalation occurred without using weapons of mass destruction. If one extrapolates this lethality curve and imagines a deviant group in some society gaining access to biological or nuclear materials within the coming decade, it is possible to imagine terrorists being able to destroy millions of lives. To kill so many people in the 20th century, a destructive individual like Hitler or Stalin required the apparatus of a totalitarian government. Unfortunately, it is now all too easy to envisage extremist groups and individuals killing millions without the help of governments. This is truly the "privatization of war" and a dramatic change in world politics. Moreover, this next step in the escalation of terrorism would have profound effects on the nature of our urban civilization. What would happen to our willingness to locate in cities, to pay high real estate prices, to visit museums and theaters if, instead of destroying two office buildings, a future attack destroys the lower half of Manhattan? The new terrorism is not like the 1970s terrorism of the IRA, the ETA or the Red Brigades. Nor is the vulnerability limited to any one society. The "business as usual" attitude towards curbing terrorism is not enough.

Common and Diverging Interests

If the new terrorism presents a profound challenge to the urban civilizations of the Trilateral countries, then efforts to counter it approximate a global public good whose production benefits all countries whether they pay for it or not. But even if there are common interests in producing a public good, there are also divergent interests in defining and paying for it.

For example, politics has plagued efforts to agree on a common definition of terrorism at the United Nations. Terrorism is a method of violent conflict that is sometimes called the weapon of the weak against the strong. Some skeptics argue that one man's terrorist is just another man's freedom fighter. Therefore treating suppression of terrorism as a global public good is merely the hypocrisy of the powerful trying to disarm the weak. But that need not be the case. Not all struggles for national liberation have turned to deliberate killing of the innocent. Deliberate killing of noncombatants (in war or not) is condemned by the moral code of most major religions, including Islam. Such behavior is unacceptable whether it is carried out by the powerful or the weak. While there are problems with any definition at the margins, the core of terrorism is clear enough to permit efforts to delegitimize it. Indeed, many countries are parties to UN conventions that commit them to combating aspects of terrorist behavior, even though the UN has not agreed on one formal definition.

In a sense, terrorism is to the 21st century what piracy was to an earlier era. Pirates used violence against commerce for their private purposes, but some governments gave pirates and privateers safe harbor in order to earn revenues or to harass their enemies. As Britain became the dominant naval power in the 19th century, it suppressed piracy and most countries benefited from that situation. A multilateral convention outlawing piracy was agreed to in Paris by mid-century. Today, some states harbor terrorists in order to attack their enemies or because they are too weak to control powerful groups. If a campaign to suppress terrorism is based on a broad coalition that focuses on the core value of delegitimizing attacks on innocent noncombatants, it has a prospect of success. While antiterrorism will not be seen as a global public good by the groups that use terror, the objective should be to isolate terrorists in public opinion, and to punish and reduce the small minority of states that give them safe harbor.

Even when there is broad acceptance of the general nature of a public good, there can be conflicts over its production. Since all benefit and none can be excluded from the benefits, there is a great incentive to ride for free. When there are many small participants, most fear that they will not reap benefits in proportion to the costs they pay, and the public good is difficult to produce. One of the virtues of a situation of unequal power like British naval preeminence in the 19th century, or American preeminence today, is that the largest country has an incentive to take the lead in suppressing piracy or terrorism because it knows that it will gain a good part of the benefits.

Nonetheless, problems of burden sharing arise, and the temptation to free-ride always exists. Countries may wish to avoid the budgetary burdens of military measures or of providing assistance in nation building. Even more dangerous is the temptation to divert terrorists to targets in other countries. Some countries may think that by appeasing terrorists or by distancing their policies from the United States they can remove themselves from the line of fire. Others may think that by tightening their domestic security systems, they can divert terrorists to softer targets in other countries.

In general, these calculations are mistaken. With regard to the specific threat from Islamic extremism, it is worth noting that citizens of many countries have suffered attacks. Many terrorists object to Western culture as well as American policies. For example, radical Islamist groups such as those responsible for bombing a nightclub in Bali have local agendas and were around before they linked up with al Qaeda.⁴ And although Osama bin Laden has complained about American troops in the land of the two holy mosques and American support for Israel, he also refers to the indignity that Muslims have suffered since Europeans dismantled the last caliphate 80 years ago. Policy issues are only part of the problem and only part of the solution. Moreover, opting out on policy issues would do nothing to deal with the deeper challenges represented by the democratization of technology. After al Qaeda is gone, deviants in many societies may be tempted by terrorism unless such methods of conflict are delegitimized and steps are taken to make them harder to use. Countries still have to cooperate to discourage the next Timothy McVeigh or Aum Shinrykio. Free-riding is always a temptation, but, in a larger perspective, it provides no escape.

In fact, one of the lessons of the efforts since September 11 is that there is no way to avoid broad cooperation. In that sense the

metaphor of war is misleading, since military force is not the major solution to the policy problem. The metaphor of war was understandable in the aftermath of September 11, but it creates as many problems as it solves. How long will the war last and how does it relate to civil liberties at home and to alliances abroad? If, for reasons stated above, terrorism is going to be with us for the long term, then we need to frame policies for a continuing struggle to reduce threats and harden targets while preserving our other values. We may be able to obtain a "victory" against al Qaeda, but that will not end the need for effective cooperation against terrorism.

Even in relation to al Qaeda, Afghanistan provides an interesting lesson. The United States' use of force was necessary and effective in defeating the Taliban government that had provided a safe haven for terrorists, but the war destroyed only a quarter or so of al Qaeda which is a network organization with cells in 60 countries. Precision bombing is not an option for countering cells in Hamburg, Singapore or Detroit. Only close civilian cooperation in intelligence sharing, police work across borders, tracing financial flows, working to pre-clear cargo manifests, passenger lists and so forth can cope with such a threat. Countries cooperate out of self-interest, but the degree of cooperation is affected by the degree of consultation in the definition of those interests. While American preeminence is instrumental in organizing cooperation, the temptation it creates for military unilateralism can become a hindrance if it reduces the willingness of others to cooperate.

Elements of a Strategy

Some who follow my reasoning thus far part company on the question of strategy. They adopt a fatalistic view and argue that there is not much more to be done in the future than in the past. It is impossible to detect, interdict and prevent all deviants from using violence against innocent civilians, so we simply have to learn to live with it. Why make extraordinary efforts if they are bound to fail?

However, even though it may be impossible to eliminate all terrorist incidents, reducing their frequency and lethality will make a large difference in their impact on our societies. We can do that by (1) delegitimizing attacks on innocent civilians as a method of conflict; (2) discouraging states from providing resources or safe harbor for those who use such methods; (3) hardening our targets at home to

make it more difficult for deviants to use terrorism successfully; (4) denying terrorists easy access to means of mass destruction, and (5) addressing issues that reduce incentives to turn to terrorism. There are five major instruments we can use to pursue these objectives: military, intelligence and police, diplomatic, homeland security and development assistance.

Military measures may not deal with the largest part of the problem, but they are essential in some instances, particularly regarding state sponsors of terrorism and failed states. Al Qaeda was able to reach its current scale because of the opportunities provided by its safe haven in Afghanistan. The military action that deprived them of that haven was not sufficient, but it was necessary. The number of states sponsoring terrorism has decreased over the past decade, and diplomacy backed by military threat can continue to reduce the number. Some failed states are so chaotically organized that they cannot be deterred from providing a haven for terrorists. In such instances, military assistance may be relevant: in others intervention may become necessary.

The Bush Administration has correctly argued that deterrence does not work where there is no return address, and preemption against terrorist groups is justifiable self-defense when deterrence is impossible. But if preemption of a clear and present danger is stretched to justify preventive wars against states that might help terrorists in the future, it creates a dangerous precedent that weakens international norms that govern the use of force. The best way to solve this dilemma is to restrict unilateral preemption to a narrowly constrained clear and present danger criterion, and to subject arguments for preventive war to multilateral scrutiny.

Intelligence sharing and police cooperation are often the most effective front line of counterterrorism. Early warning can enhance prevention as well as support police cooperation. It is often the only way to use force in situations where military action is not possible. Because of the sensitivity of sources and dangers of disclosure, much of this work will be carried out in a series of bilateral arrangements. Multilateral cooperation is possible, however, in tracing financial flows that can help to deprive terrorists of resources as well as provide useful information. Information sharing can also be enhanced by devoting more resources to underfunded organizations like Interpol.

Diplomatic measures run a wide gambit. Conventions and norms at the United Nations and regional organization levels are

important ways to help delegitimize terrorism. (Equally important is that governments be scrupulous that their behavior does **not** deliberately kill noncombatants). The UN Counterterrorism Committee chaired by Sir Jeremy Greenstock has reviewed reports of more than 178 member states about their policies to defeat terrorism and cooperate with other countries. Similar measures can occur at the regional level. Diplomatic pressures and sanctions can be brought to bear against both countries and non-governmental organizations suspected of aiding terrorists. Public diplomacy is also an important dimension. It is essential that we not leave the presentation of our policies and culture to al Jazeera and others. Yet the United States spends on public diplomacy less than one quarter of one percent of what it spends on defense.⁵ Given the dangers of terrorists getting access to weapons of mass destruction, it is also important to strengthen international regimes against proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

Homeland security is a critical part of any strategy, but there is always a question of cost and how much insurance is enough. Some people see homeland security as a secondary issue because they assume a constant supply of terrorism and argue that protecting one target simply diverts terrorists to another target. But by raising thresholds and hardening targets, it may be possible to lower the supply of terrorism. Some deviants will lack the skill or sophistication to surmount more difficult barriers and be discouraged from trying. Others will try but be caught before they can succeed. And since terrorism often engenders an imitation or copycat effect, preventing incidents can have a beneficial cumulative effect.

Working to raise the thresholds that terrorists must surmount requires a systematic approach, since plugging one hole sometimes does divert them to others. Homeland security offices must work out strategic plans to deal with the most glaring vulnerabilities at reasonable levels of cost. Since modern societies are similar in these vulnerabilities, the Trilateral countries have a great deal to learn from each other's mistakes and best practices. Trilateral governments need to go beyond intelligence and police sharing and establish regular contacts among agencies responsible for both the technical and policy dimensions of homeland security.

Moreover, as mentioned above, our societies are as vulnerable as the weakest link in transnational systems. Once someone boards a plane in a country with weak security, that person is in the system. It

makes no sense to beef up security in New York if a terrorist can enter the system easily in Rome or Lagos. At the same time, overly costly and ineffectual security can seriously disrupt trade and commerce without really improving safety. The United States, Canada and Mexico have been working effectively to monitor their borders without curtailing trade, and the European Union is evolving in similar directions. Borders are increasingly becoming regarded as zones where countries cooperate on customs and immigration inside each other's formal boundaries. Many of these transnational systems are largely in the private sector, as are many of the vulnerable domestic systems. It is crucial to work out ways to involve the private sector in improving homeland security. Science communities are already heavily connected, but more could be done to create means to share and transfer technical expertise at the industry as well as national levels.

Aid and assistance can be used to strengthen the capacities of poor countries that are involved in these transnational systems. Such investments are a clear case of coincidence between self-interest and charity. Nation building - more properly called strengthening states -is not charity, but an important dimension of a policy of prevention of terrorism. A particularly important type of assistance is in helping other countries to develop capabilities to deal with weapons of mass destruction. In the case of biological agents, assistance on world public health has become a security issue. Terrorists can obtain microbes and viruses from inadequately protected foreign laboratories, or by bribing underpaid scientists in the remnants of the Russian biological warfare system, or from natural sources. In addition, the World Health Organization reports that there were 13 naturally occurring cases of anthrax last year alone. It has created a global network of national laboratories that do early detection work, and it manages all this on a meager budget of roughly \$400 million per year.

Another crucial area for Trilateral assistance is the Cooperative Threat Reduction effort with Russia, by which we provide funds to help improve their control and destruction of weapons-usable materials. Funding also goes to scientists from former nuclear, biological and chemical weapons laboratories to help them turn to civilian work. These programs too are underfunded, although there was an agreement in principle at the G-8 summit in Canada last year for ten countries to provide \$10 billion over the next ten years.

Somewhat more controversial is the question of whether aid to development is an important counterterrorist instrument. Advocates

say that it is an important tool for "draining the swamps" or attacking the roots of terrorism. Skeptics challenge whether poverty is the root of terrorism. They argue that accusing the poor of terrorism is a libel, and that most of the September 11 terrorists were middle-class citizens of a relatively wealthy country. Moreover, if we have to wait for development assistance to raise the world from poverty as the answer to terrorism, we will all be dead.

Both sides of this argument have a point. The time horizons of development policy are out of line with the time horizons of counterterrorism, but terrorist groups are often led by well-off deviants who (like bin Laden) recruit followers by pointing to the injustices in the world. There are many reasons for development assistance by wealthy countries, but one is to deprive terrorist leaders of such arguments by showing that our policies are aligned with the long-term aspirations of the poor. It is important to provide the prospect of hope, both in material terms and in our policies towards intractable conflicts like the Middle East and Kashmir. There is no single silver bullet in the struggle against terrorism. Prevention will require a wide range of instruments, and they cannot be divorced from the other dimensions of our foreign policy including aid, trade, institution building and conflict resolution.

III. AN ASIA-PACIFIC VIEW ON COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION

Yukio Satoh

The War against Iraq

The international community has been engaged in the fight against terrorism since before September 11, 2001. The G-7 countries have played a leading role in promoting concerted efforts to combat terrorism since 1978 when their leaders issued the Bonn Statement on air-hijacking. Ever since, the G-7 (later G-8) countries have addressed the issue not only at Summit meetings but also through regular consultations of officials.

The United Nations, too, had been working as a catalyst to produce international counterterrorism agreements. Ten conventions and two protocols so far concluded cover a broad range of counterterrorism measures in such areas as civil aviation, maritime navigation, the safety of fixed platforms on the continental shelf, hostage-taking, terrorist bombing, physical protection of nuclear material and the financing of terrorism.

Indeed, the September 11 attacks dramatically changed the way the international community combats terrorism. The fundamental changes in the Americans' threat perceptions and the shift of the focus of their strategy, which was symbolized by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, had a defining impact on this change. The new American national security strategy included the possibility of acting "preemptively" against terrorists to prevent them from doing harm to the United States and its people.

At the United Nations, the terrorist attacks were unanimously and resoundingly condemned, and many countries urged quick ratification and full implementation of all the counterterrorism conventions and protocols. The Security Council quickly (on September 28) adopted Resolution 1373, which determined in the most sweeping manner ever the measures to be taken by all Member States in order to prevent and suppress terrorist acts. It also established the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) for the implementation of the resolution.

Against this backdrop, the U.S.-led military campaign to destroy al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan was supported widely. Most notably, Russia and China engaged in diplomatic and intelligence cooperation with the United States.

The U.S.-led war on Iraq, however, is having a disconcerting impact on the cohesive momentum which September 11 gave to a global campaign against terrorism. Although how the war is going to end remains yet to be seen at the time of this writing, we have to admit that the way the war started would have serious implications for international cooperation to combat terrorism. For example, the open confrontation which took place at the Security Council between the United States (and Britain), on the one hand, and France and Germany (with Russia) on the other could have a divisive impact on trans-Atlantic unity, which is essential for global cooperation to combat terrorism. Moreover, public opinion in many parts of the world expressed strong opposition to what was seen as an "American war" on Iraq. Public opinion has since become more anxious than before about the unilateral approach advocated by the so-called "neo-conservative" elements in the Bush administration. This would make it harder for the governments of American allies and friends to gain public support for their engagement in the U.S.-led campaign against global terrorism.

The anti-American sentiment among the Muslim population, not only in the Arab countries but also in Asia and elsewhere in the world, would also work to hinder efforts to organize a global campaign against terrorism. The involvement of Arab countries and the non-Arab countries with large Muslim populations, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, is essential for the success of counterterrorism efforts. The Iraq war has also brought to light the differences in the way Americans and many Europeans wish to tackle the two separate issues of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). While both share the view that the proliferation of WMDs would increase the danger of terrorism, they vary from each other on the way on how to relate the two issues.

The majority of Americans, believing that the danger of being attacked by terrorists with WMDs is real and could be imminent, support President George W. Bush's logic that Iraq under President Saddam Hussein was a threat to American national security because he might provide terrorists with WMDs. But to the Europeans, this logic appears to be overstretched. As Professor Wilkinson points out,

the majority of the European public and some key European governments (e.g., France, Germany and Russia) were deeply opposed to launching a war against Iraq because they had "no convincing evidence that Saddam played any part in the planning of the 11 September attack or in support of al Qaeda globally."

The question of how the proliferation of WMDs relates to terrorism could, unless articulated in a universally convincing manner and on a case-by-case basis, yet again lead to a serious division of views between the United States and its allies and friends as they try to work out a common strategy against global terrorism.

The Uniqueness of the Asia-Pacific Region

Many Asians share the Europeans' perception with regard to the war against Iraq, but the way they express their views is far less straightforward and self-assertive. Also, their perception of the war varies. It must be noted in this context that the way September 11 affected the security perception of the Trilateral partners in East Asia varied not only from that in North America and Europe, but also between Northeast and Southeast Asia.

In Northeast Asia, the impact of September 11 was seen more in the context of alliance cooperation between the United States and its allies rather than as a shift of focus in security concern. This was because the nature of military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and the attempt by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to possess nuclear weapons remained the primary security concerns to the countries in the region. Most notably, Japan expanded its scope of military cooperation with the United States by sending its naval vessels to the Indian Ocean to conduct refueling operations for American vessels (later for vessels of other countries) engaged in the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

On the war against Iraq, too, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi expressed unswerving support for President Bush over the latter's decision to disarm Iraq of WMDs by force. The Republic of Korea (ROK) government, too, supported the U.S.-led war against Iraq.

The firm commitment of the United States to the security of both countries is what they need as they address questions related to North Korea, particularly its attempt to possess nuclear weapons in addition to the chemical and biological weapons it is suspected to have. Japan and South Korea also need U.S. commitment as they pursue

their respective goals of normalization of relations with North Korea and reconciliation between South and North Korea.

In sharp contrast to this, the countries in Southeast Asia, particularly those with Muslim populations, were alarmed by what they saw on September 11 and the contacts they discovered between al Qaeda and local Islamic extremist groups, such as the Jemaah Islamiyah. The aborted bombing plot to attack U.S. and other western embassies in Singapore and the terrorist bombing in Bali confirmed anew the existence in the region of a real danger of home-grown and cross-border terrorism by Islamic extremists.

These developments quickly made terrorism a major focus of not only domestic security but also international security cooperation among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. The Philippine government is now engaged in a determined effort to hunt Abu Sayyaf insurgents with the support of U.S. forces. Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia signed a tripartite agreement aimed at strengthening cooperation in combating terrorism and cross-border criminal conduct, including illicit trade in arms and illicit financial transactions. The agreement was later acceded to by Thailand and Cambodia. The initially hesitant Indonesian government is intensifying its efforts to prosecute Islamic extremists.

Regional Cooperation

These differences in the focus of security concern between Northeast and Southeast Asia notwithstanding, countries in the Asia-Pacific region are pursuing region-wide cooperation to fight terrorism through various mechanisms, such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). ARF, for example, established a mechanism (Inter-Sessional Meeting) to discuss cooperation on counterterrorism and the prevention of transnational crime. Following the 2002 FIFA World Cup Korea-Japan match, ARF also produced a report on best practices for counterterrorism at major international events.

APEC, which now claims membership of 21 countries and entities in the Asia-Pacific region (including China and Russia), came to address the question of terrorism from the viewpoint of securing trade and other economic activities from the threat of terrorism. Following their announcement to cooperate in combating terror made

in Shanghai in the wake of September 11, APEC leaders stressed at Los Cabos, Mexico, last October their determination to work together for transport security with particular emphasis on the protection of cargo, ships engaged in international voyages, international aviation and people in transit. They also resolved to work jointly to deny terrorists access to the world financial system, and, to this end, to fully implement UN and other international instruments, to promote better monitoring of alternative remittance systems and non-profit organizations, and to enhance law enforcement and regulatory capabilities. The urgent need to promote cyber security was stressed, too.

What is significant about counterterrorism efforts by Asia-Pacific countries is their focus on capacity building, which many developing countries involved need in order to attain these policy goals. In response to this need, the Japanese government is providing financial and technological assistance to Asian countries in the six priority areas: namely, immigration control, aviation security, custom cooperation, export control, police and law enforcement, and terrorist financing. So too are the American, British and Australian governments.

Needless to say, the need for capacity building is not limited to the Asia-Pacific region. How to coordinate the Trilateral partners' efforts in this area is, therefore, an important subject for the Trilateral debates, to which Asian partners could make significant contributions on the basis of their own experiences.

The Trilateral partners in East Asia can also make significant contributions to efforts to produce a common strategy against global terrorism. They include both American allies, like Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and those which have large Muslim populations, such as Indonesia and Malaysia (Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world.). Given that terrorism by Islamic extremists, like al Qaeda, is now most dangerous because of its global reach and most difficult to cope with because of its strong appeal for Muslims, it is important to take into account Muslims' views with regard to the way to combat global terrorism. Furthermore, East Asian countries faced with the problem of the proliferation of WMDs by DPRK realize well the importance of denying terrorists any access to WMDs.

Given all these, regional cooperation now taking place in the Asia-Pacific region could provide a model for other regions, particularly those in the developing world.

Observations on Debates on Terrorism

Seen from a corner of the Asia-Pacific region, the following observations must be made on the arguments made from American and European points of view.

First, on the definition of terrorism, there is no doubt that to share a common definition of terrorism is important for global cooperation to combat terrorism. But the difficulty of producing a universally accepted definition of terrorism has been well-tested through past debates at the United Nations, where Arab countries argue that what the West regards as terrorist attacks by Palestinian suicide bombers is a national liberation struggle by the Palestinians against Israeli occupation.

It would be more productive to take a bricklaying approach of building up international agreements on specific measures aimed at preventing dangers that can be commonly perceived by many countries with different political, ethnic and religious characteristics. Regional cooperation, like that of the APEC process, is also effective to this end.

Second, creating better prospects for peace in the Middle East is essential for the purpose of depriving Islamic extremists of their appeal for the Arab people and Muslim populations in the other parts of the world. For the United States to demonstrate its firm commitment to peace in the Middle East and the creation of a Palestinian state is crucial in this context.

Third, the efforts to eliminate hotbeds for terrorism are critically important, too. Efforts to this end in Afghanistan are far from over. Capacity building for the domestic security arrangements of developing countries, in such areas as police, coast guard, customs and border control, as well as intelligence, is also crucial in this context. More broadly, efforts to reduce poverty and help nation building in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa, continue to be important, for failed states could easily become hotbeds for global terrorists.

Fourth, a campaign against global terrorism must be carefully designed. Should it be overstretched, it could be used as a rhetorical shield to hide human rights violations, oppressive control on minorities and other atrocities. It is also necessary to distinguish between terrorists with global reach and ambition and those acting in one country, and to let a global strategy against terrorism focus on the former instead of trying to kill two birds with one stone.

Finally, given that many international institutions and instruments are already motivated and mobilized to combat global terrorism, what is required now is to find ways to use them in a comprehensive and mutually complementary manner. The Trilateral Commission could advise governments of member countries, particularly those of G-8 countries, on how to do so.

IV. A EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT ON TERRORISM

Paul Wilkinson

Defining Terrorism

In common with the authors of the American and Asian viewpoints, I bemoan the absence of a universally accepted definition of terrorism. The European Union has at last attempted to agree on a definition, though the result could hardly be described as a great success. Instead, I will offer an academic definition: "Terrorism is the systematic use of coercive intimidation, usually to service political ends. It is used to create and exploit a climate of fear among a wider target group than the immediate victims of the violence, often to publicise a cause, as well as to coerce a target into acceding to terrorist aims. Terrorism may be used on its own or as part of a wider unconventional war. It can be employed by desperate and weak minorities, by states as a tool of domestic and foreign policy, or by belligerents as an accompaniment or additional weapon in all types and stages of warfare. A common feature is that innocent civilians, sometimes foreigners who know nothing of the terrorist political quarrel, are killed or injured."

The weapon of terror can be used for an almost infinite variety of causes and purposes. Hence, although it is quite wrong to regard terrorism as synonymous with violence in general, it is a rather broad politico-strategic concept and is therefore useful to distinguish between basic forms and contexts of terrorism by examining their underlying causes or political motivation.

One basic distinction is between *state* and *factional* terror: the former has been vastly more lethal and has often been an antecedent to, and contributory cause of, factional terrorism. Once regimes and factions decide that their ends justify any means, or that their opponents' actions justify them in unrestrained retaliation, they tend to become locked in a spiral of terror and counterterror. Internal terrorism is confined within a single state or region while international terrorism, in its most obvious manifestation, is an attack carried out across international frontiers or against foreign targets in a terrorist's state of origin. But in reality, most terrorist campaigns of a protracted

and intensive character have international dimensions as the groups involved look abroad for finance, weapons, safe haven and political support.¹

Two other key distinctions need to be made at the outset. First, it is important to distinguish the New Terrorism characterized by al Qaeda, from the more "traditional," longer-established terrorist organizations. New Terrorism groups are based on transnational networks of cells, preparative cells, affiliated groups and support networks; have multinational composition and do not need to rely on a state sponsor for securing funding, weapons etc.; and specialize in suicide no-warning attacks, often coordinated multiple attacks, aimed at inflicting large-scale loss of life, destruction of property, and economic disruption. Old-style terrorism groups tend to confine their campaigns of violence to one country or locality and have traditional command structures rather than transnational networked organizations. In addition, their long-term goals tend to be more limited and practicable, and hence have the potential to become "corrigible" groups in the terms described below, rather than "incorrigible" like al Qaeda. The latter's reputation for mass killing and its absolutist doctrines and political ambitions make it unthinkable for any democratic government to negotiate with it.

One positive development in the recent history of terrorism is that, at least in a few cases of ethno-separatist violence, the terrorism appears potentially corrigible. A combination of political initiatives, diplomacy and peace processes can sometimes even resolve highly intractable conflicts. For example, against all predictions the Northern Ireland peace process, though extremely fragile, is still surviving and terrorist killings in the Province have been dramatically reduced. An even more remarkable example where a peace process has made a breakthrough is the Norwegian-inspired initiative in Sri Lanka, which has led to a ceasefire between the Tamil Tigers and the government security forces and to peace talks, following a conflict which has cost over 64,000 lives.

Al Qaeda

There can be no doubt where al Qaeda fits in the above typology. It is the archetype of the New Terrorism, and its absolutist and grandiose ideology and record of mass murder of civilians help to explain why it is now the most severe international terrorist threat posed to peace

and security in the entire history of sub-state terrorism.

Unlike the more traditional types of terrorist groups, it is transnational in its fullest sense: it has a universalistic ideology aimed not only at forcing the United States to withdraw its forces from the Arabian Peninsula and to stop supporting Israel, but also at toppling the governments of Arab and other Muslim states it accuses of collaborating with the United States and its allies, and its ultimate aim is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate. It is not dependent on any single regime or government for its survival and financial resources. It has a presence in at least 50 countries. Its activists are drawn from a wide range of Muslim countries, and some originate from the Muslim Diaspora within Western societies.

Secondly, in addition to its central leadership and coordinating committees on military, legal, media and other matters, al Qaeda has a worldwide network of operational and preparative cells and affiliated organizations capable of being activated at any time and carrying out terrorist attacks on their own initiative. It is because of this, despite the major setback of losing its safe haven in Afghanistan, that the global network is still capable of continuing the terrorist campaign. This has been clearly demonstrated by a series of terrorist attacks, including a number that have been thwarted by the authorities. The use of overseas support networks and international terrorist attacks is, of course, nothing new in the history of terrorism. What is new about the al Qaeda network is the scale of its diffusion around the world, and, as demonstrated by the September 11 attacks, the meticulous long-term planning and terrorist tradecraft the network had been able to deploy.

Last, but not least, there are major differences between the more traditional terrorist groups and al Qaeda regarding the nature and scale of the violence the latter employs. Through its suicide airliner attacks on the World Trade Center, al Qaeda has been responsible for the most lethal acts of terrorism by a sub-state group in history. It is no accident that bin Laden's network should have been the first sub-state group to have carried out mass destruction terrorism. An American scholar once stated, "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." Sadly, for groups such as al Qaeda and its affiliates, this no longer holds. Hence, while such deadly terrorist cells are still at large, the threat to the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and other designated "enemies" of the bin Laden network remains an ever-present reality. Moreover, it is important to note that al Qaeda has carried out, planned, or attempted terrorist attacks in a

wide range of countries, including Singapore, Pakistan, India, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Italy, France, Kenya, Tanzania, Indonesia, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. It is also very clear that a terrorist group like al Qaeda, which sets out to kill as many civilians as possible, would have no compunction about using chemical, biological, and radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons if it manages to weaponize the appropriate materials. Hence, the threat of CBRN terrorism has been brought a step closer by the September 11 attacks.²

Al Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to survive and adapt in the face of major setbacks it has suffered. In the wake of the defeat of the Taliban regime which has provided a useful safe haven, bin Laden and many of his followers slipped across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. Following the capture of Abu Zubaydah, al Qaeda's external operations director, in March 2002, the organization replaced him with another highly skilled and fanatical planner of terrorist operations, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the man suspected of masterminding the September 11 attacks in the United States, captured in Pakistan in March 2003. Al Qaeda has the resilience and reserves of experienced leaders to rapidly fill such gaps. Moreover, bin Laden's global network has managed to circumvent the best efforts of the G-7 Finance Ministers' Task Force and appears to still be able to move funds across borders, to smuggle diamonds and other valuable commodities, and to use organized crime, such as credit card fraud, to raise money for its "holy war." Nor should we underestimate the role of the Islamic banks and charitable organizations as a means of siphoning large sums of money to al Qaeda on the scale required to support a global network of cells, training camps and other facilities to wage a jihad with global reach.³

September 11- Strategic Significance and Europe's Response

The multiple-suicide hijacking attack of September 11 on the United States was unprecedented in the history of sub-state terrorism in terms of the numbers killed and the scale of destruction and economic damage caused in a single day. By its readiness to attack civilians on such a scale and without any compunction, and by its demonstrated ability to hit the solar plexus of the U.S. financial sector, al Qaeda demonstrated that it had become a strategic threat not only to U.S. national security, but also to international security. Post mortems on the attack in the immediate aftermath inevitably concentrated on the

failures of the U.S. intelligence and aviation security, and the shocking fact that there was no prior warning of the attack and no measures were taken to help prevent it.

However, European governments were in a similar position. They immediately realised that they too were handicapped by a huge intelligence deficit on al Qaeda's activities. They were also all too well aware that al Qaeda could launch similarly devastating attacks on targets within their own borders: there was no magic immunity against such a ruthless and well-prepared terrorist network with global reach.

European governments and security agencies also woke up rather belatedly to the danger that this new breed of international terrorism would be capable of using chemical, biological, radiological or even nuclear attacks if they had the weapons available. (U.S. authorities had become concerned about these dangers rather earlier, and had already started to take some measures to prevent, or, if necessary, to respond to such attacks).⁴ There was plenty of evidence to support this revised assessment of the terrorist threat:

1. Al Qaeda and its affiliates share an absolutist ideology, and believe they are waging a total war, a violent jihad in which the end justifies the means.
2. Al Qaeda does not apparently feel constrained by any moral or humanitarian limits to the lethality of their attacks. They do not distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, or between civilians and the military. To the contrary, bin Laden has explicitly urged all Muslims to attack Americans and their allies, including civilians, whenever and wherever the opportunity arises.
3. Al Qaeda cells have planned to carry out a number of attacks involving chemical weapons and poisons on targets in Europe, which were fortunately thwarted as a result of police/intelligence cooperation. Al Qaeda planned, for example, a sarin nerve gas attack on the European Parliament in Strasbourg and a cyanide attack on the water supply to the U.S. Embassy in Rome. Also, volumes 11 and 12 of the *Encyclopedia of the Jihad*, used by the organization, deal specifically with CBRN weapons.
4. In May 2002, U.S. authorities arrested a U.S. citizen, who had converted to Islam and who is alleged to have visited al Qaeda's facilities in Pakistan and Afghanistan, on suspicion of involvement in planning a "dirty bomb" attack in the United States.

European public opinion shared the grief and sadness of Americans over the September 11 atrocities. European governments and security agencies did not need any convincing that they needed to join President Bush's coalition against terrorism, and to greatly intensify their individual and collective efforts to prevent and combat al Qaeda's mass destruction terrorism. European NATO allies invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and offered full support to their American allies. Without exception they joined the measures initiated by the UN and the EU to fight terrorist financing, to strengthen intelligence and police cooperation and to capture al Qaeda cells and bring them to justice. It is also worth noting that the European Union took action, under the "third pillar" of Justice and Home Affairs, to concert action among member states to freeze terrorist assets, to launch fast-track extradition, and to establish Joint Investigation Teams to deal with international terrorism. Europol's role in helping to combat terrorism has been considerably expanded.⁵

A more specific example of EU efforts in combating terrorism throughout the Union's territory including Schengen countries is the 13 June, 2002 Council Framework Decision on the "European Arrest Warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States" to enter into force on January 1, 2004. Terrorism clearly falls into the scope of this Decision, and the September 11 attacks ensured it was accelerated within the EU decision-making process. In sum, the objective is to create a uniform EU criminal law *acquis* for fighting terrorism, so that no "safe havens" for terrorists are inadvertently formed. Remaining within the Schengen countries, these should erect and maintain an equal level of counterterrorist protection and proficiency.

Beyond specific measures undertaken to reinforce the role of Europol such as the creation of its "Terrorism Task Force" and the "Open Source Digest" including the Arabic-English Translation System, a European agency for judicial cooperation - Eurojust - is currently under development to coordinate and support cooperation between national judicial authorities at EU level.

However, additional empowerment of agencies with legal authority is less important than increased intra-EU cooperation, technical capabilities and additional manpower. Today severely lacking in resources, these agencies are further overwhelmed by the fourfold burden of fighting organized crime, economic crime, illegal immigration and terrorism.

None of this suggests any reluctance to strengthen action against terrorism. Hundreds of arrests of al Qaeda suspects have been made in Europe, and it is noteworthy that the only person convicted for involvement in planning and assisting the September 11 suicide hijackers is el Motassadeq, convicted by a German court in Hamburg.

Differences between U.S. and European Approaches to Combating Al Qaeda

However, although there is strong agreement between the United States and the European governments that combating al Qaeda is a top priority requiring maximum multilateral cooperation, there are major differences over the best methods and strategies to achieve this goal. The United States, as the term "war on terrorism," implies, believes strongly in utility of military action. Most Europeans supported the use of the military to depose the Taliban regime which had given safe haven to al Qaeda in Afghanistan, but the majority of the European public and some key European governments (e.g. France, Germany and Russia) remain deeply opposed to the launching of the war against Iraq, because a) they have no convincing evidence that Saddam played any part in planning the September 11 attacks or in supporting al Qaeda globally, and b) they believe that an invasion of Iraq may provide al Qaeda and other extremist Islamist groups with propaganda, and that it is likely to stimulate far more terrorist attacks against the United States and other western countries.

Secondly, European governments and publics are concerned about the apparent willingness of U.S. authorities to suspend normal human rights protections of terrorist suspects by detaining them without trial. They would prefer to see the United States using the federal criminal justice system, highly regarded in Europe for its independence, integrity and fairness.

These differences are by no means inconsequential, but I believe their significance has been somewhat exaggerated. We should not allow them to undermine the intelligence and political and diplomatic cooperation against terrorism so vital for success of unraveling the al Qaeda global network. Al Qaeda's elusive global network of cells is insensitive to traditional deterrence of a military nature. The intelligence war against al Qaeda is the key to success, and to win this the Americans and the Europeans and the Asians all need each other. The idea that the U.S. "hyperpower" is enough to achieve success in the task unilaterally is a dangerous illusion.

Major Recommendations for Action

1. The European Union (EU) should strengthen and fully implement its agreed measures and enhance its resources and coordination for combating international terrorism.
2. The EU should intensify assistance to EU accession states, especially for fighting against organized crime and terrorism.
3. Urgent measures should be taken to establish a fully coordinated counterterrorism effort by NATO and the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), especially in the provision of civil protection and emergency planning to deal with CBRN terrorist attacks.
4. Urgent measures should be taken to strengthen the security, monitoring and accounting procedures for all CBRN materials including those used in the civil nuclear industry and radioactive isotopes used for non-industrial purposes.
5. Major efforts should be made to ensure that all counterterrorism policies and measures are fully compatible with the European Convention of Human Rights and the maintenance of democracy and the rule of law.
6. A major programme of public diplomacy should be launched a) to show that terror is itself a threat to the most basic human rights and is an illegitimate form of struggle, b) to make clear that the campaign against al Qaeda and its affiliates is a campaign against terrorism and not Islam, and c) to enlist full support and cooperation from the public and from the private sector to ensure the success of policies and measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Europe can play a key part in winning the battle of the hearts and minds of the young in Europe and beyond.

V. CONCLUSION

The new terrorism poses an unprecedented threat to the Trilateral countries. The prospect of terrorists getting access to weapons of mass destruction is not science fiction. Cooperation is essential. We have mentioned a number of findings and responses in our report, but we highlight here the ten which we regard as most significant.

1. Terrorism cannot be solved unilaterally. Multilateral civilian cooperation will be essential for an effective response. Military actions and robust independent domestic measures are only a part of what is needed, and they must be undertaken in a manner that does not undercut multilateral cooperation. Afghanistan is a case in point. American military action was essential for removing the Taliban government that provided a haven for terrorism but it destroyed only a small portion of al Qaeda which is a transnational network with cells in 60 countries. Dealing with such organizations requires close civilian cooperation in intelligence, information sharing, tracing financial flows, police work across borders, and communication among customs and immigration officials.
2. Officials responsible for home security should meet regularly to discuss common vulnerabilities and compare best practices. Ironically, "home" security is an international issue, because the security of transnational systems is no stronger than the weakest link in the chain. Though the names of ministries differ in their different countries, the G-8 leaders should encourage the relevant ministers to undertake regular meetings and report to the annual summit.
3. More work should be done on sharing of intelligence within and between countries. This should include analytic intelligence. While tactical intelligence is important in warning of particular terrorist actions, analytic intelligence looks for syndromes of terrorist recruitment and for patterns of vulnerabilities that might attract terrorists. For example, it might have been impossible to have identified all potential terrorist actors in 2001, but it would not have been impossible to have used "red team/blue team" analysis to identify the fact that terrorist hijackers could turn civil aircraft

into giant cruise missiles, and that strengthened cockpit doors would have made that scenario less likely.

4. Wealthier countries should provide assistance to poorer countries to improve both their counterterrorism capabilities and the effectiveness of their home security offices. Overseas development budgets should include this among their priorities. The European Union should make it an area of cooperation with the new entrants from Central Europe. Given the dangers that can arise from failed states, assistance to strengthening of relevant state institutions is an important part of a counterterrorism strategy.
5. Dialogues about the protection of civil liberties in the face of security threats should be a regular feature of the meetings of home security officials and should be reinforced by meetings of judicial officials and parliamentarians. Assistance programs must include attention to human rights issues. Not only are such values central to the definition of the civilization that we seek to protect, but overreactions to insecurity that infringe civil liberties undercut the soft or attractive power that is essential to maintain the support of moderate opinion and to deprive terrorists from recruiting new converts. The use of domestic alerts is often necessary, but countries must be wary of excessive use that creates the climate of fear terrorists seek to instill.
6. A particularly important dimension of assistance is the Cooperative Threat Reduction program designed to stabilize the security of the weapons of mass destruction left in the states of the former Soviet Union after the end of the Cold War. The agreement of ten countries to add to the planned expenditures of the U.S. government over the next decade was an important pledge at the 2002 G-8 summit, but it is crucial that the pledges be fulfilled and that the issue retains high level attention.
7. Further steps should be taken to delegitimize the deliberate use of force against noncombatants. While it may be difficult to arrive at a formal definition of terrorism, the ten conventions and two protocols so far concluded at the United Nations are important and it would be useful to increase the number of participating countries. The work of the UN Counterterrorism Committee plays a useful role, as do actions of regional organizations such as the EU, APEC and ARE Political leaders might consider encouraging a conference of religious leaders to speak out against misuse of

- religion by extremists and to condemn the types of statements and textbooks that encourage terrorist actions.
8. More funds should be invested in public diplomacy campaigns related to counterterrorism. Private channels in poor countries often promote distorted and dangerous portraits of the Trilateral countries and incitements to terrorist acts. There is a need to counter such propaganda. This might include a study of the highly biased and inflammatory textbooks that are used in some religious schools, combined with coordinated programs to present countervailing information.
 9. Major efforts should be made to mediate, conciliate, and resolve issues involved in the serious conflicts that are seedbeds for the growth of terrorist activities. Progress on the Middle East peace process would greatly dampen the opportunities for recruitment by extremist groups, and help to get Islamic countries more involved in the fight against terrorism. Other difficult issues such as Kashmir also act as seedbeds for terrorism and require attention.
 10. The metaphor of war can be misleading in planning investments and developing a strategy to counter the new terrorism. While military force is an essential part of the struggle, there will not be a definitive battle or victory, and it would be a mistake to suspend civil liberties indefinitely. There is no single solution in the struggle against terrorism, and counterterrorism policy must be integrated with other dimensions of domestic and foreign policy such as aid, trade, institution building and conflict resolution. We are in this for the long haul.

FOOTNOTES

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Therese Delpech, *International Terrorism and Europe* (Paris, Institute for Security Studies, 2002) p. 31.

II. AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE, by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

1. National Research Council, *Making the Nation Safer* (Washington, National Academies Press, 2002) p. 25.

2. See Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*, Chapter 2, for details. (Oxford University Press, 2002).

3. Walter Laqueur, "Left, Right and Beyond: The Changing Face of Terror," in James Hoge and Gideon Rose, *How Did This Happen ?*, (New York, Public Affairs Press, 2001) p. 74.

4. Raymond Bonner, "Radical Islamists a Threat to Southeast Asia Even if Al Qaeda is Eliminated, Singapore Says," *New York Times*, (Jan. 10, 2003) p. 11.

5. Council on Foreign Relations, "Report of the Task Force on Public Diplomacy" (New York, 2002).

IV. A EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT, by Paul Wilkinson

1. Paul Wilkinson, "Why Modern Terrorism?," in C. Kegley (ed), *The New Global Terrorism* (Upper Saddle River, NJ, Prentice Hall, 2003) pp. 106-107.

2. Paul Wilkinson, "The New International Terrorism," paper to Trilateral Commission (Europe) Task Force Meeting (London, February 20, 2003).

3. For valuable information on current trends in the financing of al Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, I am indebted to Herve de Carmoy.

4. See Europol's first "counter terrorism report" to the JHA Ministerial Council (Council Document 7514/1/99), (May 3, 1999).

5. For a detailed account of EU measures, see Frank Gregory, "The EU's Response to 9/11: An Analysis of the Policies and Key Issues," *Jane's Intelligence Review*; and D. Dubois, "The Attacks of 11 September: EU-US Cooperation Against Terrorism in the Field of Justice and Home Affairs," *European Foreign Affairs Review*, vol. 7, (2002) pp. 317-335.